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Protestantism and Capitalism Revisited, in the Rural Highlands of Ecuador

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The central concern of this paper is to examine some of the consequences of the penetration of capitalism among a group of Ecuadorian Indian peasants, recently converted to Protestantism. Particular attention is given to the role played by certain ideological practices in the extraction and appropriation of the peasants' surplus. It is argued that, in addition to the analysis of the economic aspects of the interdependence between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production, the concept of 'ideological articulation' is particularly useful in the understanding of those social formations which have suffered successive colonialisms. The problem of Protestantism is analyzed in the context of the changing social relations of production, and in relation to the ideologies of 'ethnicity' and 'nationalism'. The paper concludes with some remarks on the redefinition of 'tradition', and on the development of political consciousness among Indian peasants.

*Introduction*¹

The purpose of this paper is to discuss some of the complexities of the process by which a group of Ecuadorian Indian peasants, recently converted to evangelical Protestantism, is being incorporated into a dependent capitalist economy.

As a justifiable reaction against attempts to explain the peasants' role in the process of change only in terms of ideology (e.g. Erasmus's '*encogido syndrome*' or Foster's 'image of limited good'), recent Marxist-oriented studies of peasantries [e.g. Cliffe 1977; Raikes 1978; Scott 1976; Ennew, Hirst and Tribe 1977] have emphasised the economic aspects of the interdependence between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production. However, a Marxist analysis which tries to reveal both the continuous efforts of the ruling classes to maintain and reproduce their domination, and the peasants' consciousness of their situation, must also give due consideration to political, religious, juridical and ideological practices. It is through historical and ethnographic studies of particular processes of the economic and ideological articulation of capitalism with precapitalist social relations, that we can get a better understanding of the character of the social formations of the so-called third world.

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A further introductory remark about the title of this paper is required. Whenever capitalism and Protestantism appear together, we are reminded of Weber's thesis on the importance of ascetic Protestantism in determining the individual motivations to, and legitimation of, the rational practices of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in early capitalist development [1958]. Because in the case of Ecuador I am confronted on the one hand with peasants, and on the other with mature capitalism, it is not my intention to search for an equivalent 'ascetic entrepreneur' in the middle of the rural highlands. However, the problem of the relation between religious ideas and economic interests cannot be easily dismissed. Weber himself was careful to note that 'no economic ethic has ever been determined solely by religion' [1969: 268]. Furthermore, he argues:

The religious determination of life-conduct, however, is also one – note this – only one, of the determinants of the economic ethic. Of course the religiously determined way of life is itself profoundly influenced by economic and political factors operating within given geographical, political, social, and national boundaries (*ibid.*).

This recommendation for historical specificity, coupled with Weber's observation that already by the nineteenth century victorious capitalism had a life of its own, devoid of its ascetic roots, suggests that we have to investigate the ideological practices which keep mature capitalism alive today, especially in rural areas of the third world. This was certainly not a problem which Weber contemplated.

Furthermore, because Weber was primarily interested in the life conduct of those social strata which have most strongly influenced 'the practical ethic of their respective religions' (*ibid.*), he rarely discusses the religion of the peasants. He tends to regard the peasant – as most great religious traditions – as religiously suspect, a paganus [1968, *vol. 2*: 470–1]. His most clear statement about peasants appears in *The Social Psychology of the World Religion* as follows:

Peasants have been inclined towards magic. Their whole economic existence has been specifically bound to nature and has made them dependent upon elemental forces. They readily believe in a compelling sorcery directed against spirits who rule over or through natural forces, or they believe in simply buying divine benevolence. Only tremendous transformations of life-orientation have succeeded in tearing them away from this universal and primeval form of religiosity [1969: 283].

Although one may doubt the 'universality' of this characterisation of peasants' religion, it is an accurate description of some of the salient features of the folk-Catholicism of Andean peasants. When Weber discusses the peasants in relation to Protestantism, he sees them as inspired by the new doctrine of the Reformation primarily because they wanted to free themselves from the payment of those forms of labour rent which were not justified in the Bible [1968, *Vol. 3*: 1196]. Weber remained sceptical of the peasants ever being the

carriers of rational ethical religious movements [1968, Vol. 2: 469]. However, we are now confronted with thousands of Andean peasants converted to forms of evangelical Protestantism that are very rational in Weber's terms. Could it be the case that the penetration of capitalism in the countryside constitutes this 'tremendous transformation' in the peasants' way of life which Weber saw as the prime mover of peasants' religious change? How can we explain this process in relation to the attempts by mature capitalism to establish its ideological hegemony in rural areas of third world countries, where previous ideological traditions are still part of the dynamics of everyday practices? Obviously, I do not have definite answers to these major questions. This paper will only offer some preliminary answers.

In recent years, the literature on peasants in complex societies has dealt extensively with the nature of the articulation of capitalism with non-capitalist modes of production.² Most authors [e.g. Bradby 1975; Cliffe 1977; Laclau 1971; Long 1978; Meillassoux 1972; Roseberry 1976] seem to agree that capitalist expansion and its penetration in the rural areas of the third world has not been universally successful, nor even a smooth and irreversible process, but rather a convergence of contradictory forces. Complex forms of articulation involving both persistence and destruction reflect a continuous dialectic between capitalism and previous social formations. Class formation, class disintegration, and class conflict are important elements in this process. They will be shaped both by the changes brought about by capitalism and by the specific dynamics of the pre-existing social formations.

In the case of Latin America, Quijano [1974: 394] has argued that the combination of imposed metropolitan capitalism and precapitalist relations happens under the hegemony of the former. Consequently, previous relations of production do not just 'persist' or 'survive', but are continuously assuming new functions and characteristics within the whole [*ibid.*: 396, 401]. Essentially, Roseberry makes the same argument suggesting that in processes of articulation, 'while the precapitalist form is maintained, its basis will have been altered' [1976: 47 *emphasis in the original*]. Furthermore, the evidence from Ecuador and from Peru [see Smith 1979; Long & Richardson 1978] seems to confirm Quijano's argument that some precapitalist forms, such as petty commerce in goods and services, artisan production, and peasant agriculture are actually expanding to become what Quijano calls the 'marginal pole' of the economy [*ibid.*: 405]. What this means is that, because of their new mode of articulation with the overall economic structure, these non-capitalist sectors expand, but may also contract, due to their loss of control of productive resources and markets. Other authors have indicated that the workers from these sectors can also benefit capitalism by constituting a reserve of cheap labour [Meillassoux 1972: 103] or by contributing, in several ways, to cheapen the cost of the reproduction of urban labour [Wolpe 1972: 252]. In relation to the internal dynamics of these sectors, Long & Richardson [1978: 188] have indicated that we need to take a closer look at their

internal differentiation and at the different strategies (economic and cultural) by which they further their own reproduction.

Given these complex interrelationships, as I have encountered them in the case of peasants in Ecuador I tend to agree with that theoretical approach which regards capitalism as making different demands (e.g. labour, resources) from the non-capitalist modes, at different periods in its development.³ Bradby suggests that

as this theory assumes neither universal destructiveness on the part of capitalism nor a general tendency towards the preservation of pre-capitalist modes of production, the task of analysis will be to discover what are the historical conditions which lead to either of these tendencies in particular cases [1975: 129].

When capitalism expands and penetrates rural areas, the dominant classes will attempt to establish the political, legal and ideological forms necessary for its functioning and stability. In this process they will encounter ideological practices which originated in social relations now subordinate to capitalism. To explain this situation it is useful to introduce the concept of 'ideological articulation'⁴ in order to avoid static ones such as 'survivals' and 'persistence of tradition'. 'Ideological articulation' allows for a dynamic and historical analysis because it does not assume – as classical modernisation theory did – that the disappearance of non-capitalist ideological practices is a precondition for modernisation, nor does it adhere to Marx's over-enthusiastic view in the *Communist Manifesto* that 'the bourgeoisie, whenever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations' [Marx & Engels 1969: 111].

My evidence for Ecuador shows that capitalism has not yet successfully incorporated nor effectively eliminated all precapitalist ideological practices and, if some native groups are able to win their present struggles, capitalism may never totally incorporate or eliminate those practices.⁵

Furthermore, it can be argued that all these ideological practices do not necessarily have to be eliminated in order for capitalism to be successful. Ruling classes might use some to their advantage or they may try to eliminate those which in any way hinder or endanger the stability and expansion of their hegemonic power. As Raymond Williams has argued:

a lived hegemony is always a process . . . it does not just passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not all its own [1977: 112].

Hegemony is not established, nor maintained, without conflicts and readjustments between classes, and ethnic and other social groups, where alternative or oppositional ideologies are formed. This is particularly true in the case of the Andean social formations, where successive colonialisms (Inca, Spanish, North American) have generated different layers of ideologi-

cal practices based on quite contradictory principles and meanings. If, as we have argued above, social relations of previous modes of production are being articulated with capitalism in more or less contradictory and conflicting ways, ideologies will designate the complexities of these relations in the conscious practices of human beings. More specifically, my intention here is to explain how political and juridical bourgeois discourses, as well as the peasants' new Protestantism, articulate with ideological practices (e.g. racism, paternalism) generated in previous social formations to shape both the nature of the practices of domination of the ruling classes, and the peasants' class and ethnic consciousness. I will also argue that an analysis of the forms this ideological articulation takes in different historical periods will help our understanding of peasants' alliances with other classes, and the nature of class confrontations.

The Colta Region

The peasant population to be discussed is that living in Colta. This region comprises several Quichua Indian communities located on the shores of or near the Colta lake, and on the upper lands leading to the high plateau (*paramo*) in the province of Chimborazo.

The transformation of the traditional *hacienda* system of the Ecuadorian highlands gathered momentum after the first and rather lukewarm Agrarian Reform Law of 1964 and the abolition of *precarismos* in 1970, and after the new Reform Law passed in 1973 eliminated rent in labour and gave the peasants legal ownership of their plots. The rest of the land was sold to individual peasant households. At present, the Colta peasants are petty-commodity producers. They rely on agriculture, complemented by the raising of sheep, pigs and cattle on a small scale as a source of cash income. Due to the altitude (from about three thousand metres at the lakeside to about four thousand at the *paramo*) and land erosion, agricultural production is confined to barley, potatoes, broad beans, *quinoa*, onions and some of the highland tubers (*ocas*, *mellocos* and *mashua*). Unless there is a poor harvest, portions of these crops are sold regularly in the local markets, mainly in Riobamba, the capital of the province and the largest market town in the area.

The land bordering the lake is held and utilised communally for grazing sheep flocks and cattle belonging to individual families. Women and small children are in charge of this task. The *titora* reeds from the lake are gathered for fodder, fuel, and the weaving of *esteras* (mats), sold in Riobamba as a minor supplement to the income of peasant households. Most of the land used for cultivation is scattered on the slopes of the rolling hills which ascend from the lake. However, like most Andean peasants [Murra 1975], those in Colta try to get access to other microecologies by entering into socioeconomic relationships with peasants living in communities located in the upper lands or near the *paramo*. The main unit of production is the nuclear family. Extra-household work is obtained primarily by reciprocal labour arrange-

ments with kin, fictive kin, and now, more often, with *hermanos* or 'brothers in Christ'.

In the last ten years or so, the majority of the Colta Indians have been converted to evangelical Protestantism by the Gospel Missionary Union (GMU), an interdenominational religious organisation. Because the *evangelicos* – as Protestant Indians are called – do not drink alcohol, many *mestizos*, owners of canteens who used to prosper on the Indians' celebration of folk-Catholic rituals, have now left the area. A small group of white North American missionaries of the GMU live in Majipamba, one of the lake communities which is the centre for the diffusion of Protestantism. My fieldwork was centred in this community. However, this paper attempts to deal with the Colta area as a whole, since most other communities basically share Majipamba's ecological and socioeconomic characteristics. All these peasants refer to themselves as Quichuas.

As I have discussed elsewhere [*Muratorio, in press*], two factors have been primarily responsible for the successful penetration of Protestantism among peasants in Chimborazo since 1965: a) the breakdown of the *hacienda* as a system of domination and labour control, and b) the change in the ideological orientation of the Catholic church calling for the direct intervention of its priests in the liberation of the poor from social and economic injustices. This new role of the church contributed significantly to undermining the hegemony of the landowning class which, since colonial times, had been legitimised by traditional Catholicism.

In Colta, the agrarian reform was decisive in weakening the power of the landowning class, and in providing peasants with the freedom which accrues from access to private property. The liberalisation of the church granted the peasants freedom from their traditional authority and the 'private space' (physical and spiritual) which Lukes [1973: 144] regards as essential for the emergence of 'religious individualism'. Both these developments were responsible for destroying previous systematic opposition to the work of the Protestant missionaries.

The ideological domination of Catholicism has now been replaced by a certain degree of 'religious pluralism', and consequently 'tolerance', both of which often seem to accompany the development of bourgeois social relations. As Christopher Hill noted for the English Reformation:

Religious toleration, consumer's choice in religion, is the natural concomitant of the emerging economic order of free industrial production and internal free trade. [1969, quoted in Moore 1971: 89].

In Colta, the majority of the peasants have been converted to the Gospel Missionary Union version of Protestantism. However, some have remained Catholics, while others have turned to competing Protestant missions now active in the whole province. Although it cannot be assumed that all the peasants in this area are in the same class situation, religious factionalism has produced ideological cleavages within the peasantry, weakening its unity and, in general, hindering the development of class consciousness. This

issue is discussed later on in the paper. Now I must turn to the precapitalist social relations of production in the *hacienda* and the ideological practices which reproduced them.

Hacienda, Church, and 'Aristocratic Racism'

Until the agrarian reform decade of the sixties, the Colta peasant economy was subordinated to the precapitalist mode of production dominated by the *hacienda*. The largest estate in the region was the *hacienda* Colta Monjas, originally owned by a religious order of nuns. When in the early 1900s the liberal government of Eloy Alfaro confiscated church properties, Colta Monjas was placed under the administration of the *Junta Central de Asistencia Social*, a state charity organisation. The Junta rented the *hacienda* to individual landowners who relied on *mestizo* administrators and overseers (*mayordomos*) for the daily supervision of production. All the labour force was of Indian descent.

Colta Monjas had twenty two *huasipunguero* families attached to it. *Huasipungueros* were those peasants who paid their rent in labour to the estate and worked as *huasicamas* (house servants), in exchange for rights to usufruct plots, to pasturage, and to gather *tatora* from the lake. Although *huasipungueros* were paid a nominal wage of a few cents a week for their labour, they speak about their condition then as one of 'serfdom' because, as they realised, the value of the produce supplied to the *hacienda*, and the cost of the animals lost while working as shepherds for the estate, were always greater than their wages. The system of debt-peonage kept them tied to the *hacienda*; fear of losing their usufruct plots, and physical punishment, kept them subordinate.

Since colonial times, the peasant communities surrounding the *hacienda* Colta Monjas were 'free indigenous communities' with legal titles to arable and pasture lands. Nevertheless, they were also inextricably subordinated to the *hacienda*. The overseers extracted rent in labour and in kind from the community peasants by all forms of extra-economic coercion, including physical violence. Any trespassing on *hacienda* lands was a good excuse for the overseer to seize clothing and animals from the Indians in order to force them to work a few days free for the estate. In order to ensure this labour more efficiently, in 1935 the then renter of the *hacienda* seized part of the communal pasture lands and cut the *comuneros* from access to their *tatora* lands. Conflicts resulting from that seizure were finally resolved only in 1978.

Both 'free peasants' and *huasipungueros* had effective possession of the means of production. Their surplus was extracted through forms of extra-economic coercion [Marx 1962: Vol. III: 771]. The landowning class had actual control of the state, and could invoke force against any form of peasant insubordination. The social relations of production under which the peasants were used as servile labour were legitimised as 'natural' because of the colonial belief in the Indians' racial inferiority. The social order was also legitimised as 'sacred' by the ideological practices of the Catholic church, which regarded it as ordained by God. Both these ideological elements were

legalised in the Constitution of 1830, where parish priests were nominated as legal guardians of the 'miserable indigenous race' [Hurtado 1977: 69]. A series of secular and religious rituals, such as forms of address, prayers, specific fiestas, were used by priests, landowners and *mayordomos* to symbolise the alleged inferiority and polluting quality of the Indians, and to impress upon them the power of the hegemonic ideology [see Maynard 1966]. Although Barnett and Silverman [1978] are primarily interested in discussing the ideological practices of contemporary capitalism, their explanation of the 'symbolism of personal domination' provides an accurate characterisation of the type of domination prevailing in the traditional Ecuadorian *hacienda*. They state:

People who are personally dominated are ideologically represented as being substantially incomplete or defective; they are represented as being less-than-full individuals . . . In the ideology, these substantializations (e.g. race and sex, which are posed as being aspects of biological substance) become substitutable for one another, in particular ways. Forces which are invoked to justify action (e.g. God, Nature) also become substitutable for one another in particular ways. [*Ibid.*: 42].

The ideological practices of the *hacienda* emphasised personal worthlessness, subservience, deference and dependency on the part of the Indian peasants, and a form of 'aristocratic racism'⁶ on the part of the landed oligarchy, based on a claim of generalised superiority over the 'inferiors'. Under this view of the world, the landowners could justify their power to regulate not only the peasants' labour, but also their religious, political and family life. It was a form of 'feudal' domination, in the sense that Perry Anderson refers to a class of feudal nobles as 'enjoying *personal* rights of exploitation and jurisdiction over dependent peasants, consecrated in law' [1974: 408-9, *emphasis is in the original*]. Generalised exchanges and diffuse obligations between acknowledged inferiors and superiors served to veil the enforced surplus labour actually surrendered by the peasants. These obligations became codified in traditions (*camaris*, gifts, *compadrazgos*, special services) and in legal forms which made for the 'regulated and orderly' reproduction of the social relations in the *hacienda*. This is the sense in which Marx uses the term 'tradition' to explain how it is possible to extract labour rent when the direct producers have access to the means of production.

However, it is evident that tradition must play a dominant role in the primitive and undeveloped circumstances on which those social relations and the corresponding mode of production are based. It is furthermore clear that here as always it is in the interests of the ruling section of society to sanction the existing order as law and to legally establish its limits given through usage and tradition [1962 *Vol. 3*: 774-5].

To argue that a particular conceptualisation of ethnicity - aristocratic racism - was the main ideological form to legitimise and reproduce the traditional social relations, does not mean that the Indians accepted this specific

form of legitimation. Ethnicity was used as an oppositional ideology in several Indian rebellions which took place in Chimborazo, especially during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries [see *Moreno Yanex 1977: 353-79*]. The subversive ideological element lay in the Indians' redefinition of their 'tradition' as one which excluded white domination.

Currently, peasants in Colta often talk about their past life in the large *hacienda*. In these accounts they refer to themselves as 'serfs' and 'slaves' in relation to the whites and *mestizos* who controlled their lives. Their stories are not intended as formal ideological statements, but constitute forms of practical consciousness through which the peasants relive and reflect upon social relations of production. As conscious experiences, these relations have become internalised as part of the peasant culture of this area, a culture which – as Williams argues – has to be seen 'as lived dominance and subordination of particular classes' [1977: 110]. In all their tragedy and humour these reminiscences represent a form of critical consciousness and ideological struggle, in so far as they help the peasants to demystify the feudal and colonial ideological elements, which still support oppressive social practices.

It is clear that the changes brought about by the agrarian reform, the missionaries, and the consolidation of the power of the state in the countryside, represent an actual challenge to traditional domination. Presently, the Quichuas are involved in religious (Protestantism), civic, (courts of law), political (citizenship, vote), and economic (labour and commodity markets) practices, none of which is under the direct and personal control of the landlords. It is also clear that these activities are framed in the legal forms and conducted through the legal machinery of the capitalist state. However, many of the ideological contents which corresponded to the precapitalist relations of production have been incorporated into the new practices of bourgeois domination.

Capitalist penetration and ideological forms of domination

During the 1960s, Ecuador – like many other Latin American countries – became subject to foreign pressures to introduce reforms consistent with the 'developmentalist' goals of the Alliance for Progress. The 1964 agrarian reform was sponsored, and in some regions (e.g. Colta) implemented, by the Ecuadorian Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonisation (IERAC) in collaboration with the US Agency for International Development. The ideology of that reform – as well as the later one of 1973 – emphasised 'modernisation' by the 'destruction of feudal structures', 'agricultural productivity', and 'justice' in a 'harmonious Ecuador' [*Ley de Reforma Agraria*]. Despite the fact that IERAC promised to compensate landlords with bonds which they could then invest in industry, many landlords in Chimborazo were opposed to any form of change. Deprived of access to free labour, they started selling the land to land-hungry peasants. But in general the two reforms corresponded with the goals of the liberal state to establish capitalist relations of production in the countryside. In other

provinces, enterprising landlords took advantage of these developments [see Barsky 1978: Murmis 1978]. From 1972, the participation in oil revenues allowed the state to play a greater role in the economy, and to enlarge and modernise its bureaucratic structure [NACLA 1975; Verduga 1977]. The state was then able to establish the political conditions under which the peasants' surplus is created and transferred to other classes. But when peasant production articulates with capitalism, the mechanisms for surplus extraction become complex, and depend on coercion which is often simultaneously economic and extra-economic.

The consequences of capitalist penetration in Colta can be discerned in the changes in the roles of family, kinship and the state in production relations, in the forms of peasant participation in produce and labour markets, in the trends towards absolute privatisation and concentration of land, and in the resulting incipient class differentiation within the peasantry. It is not possible, in the context of this paper, to devote equal attention to all these aspects. I will concentrate on those which relate most directly with the main argument on ideological articulation.

Access to land and other means of production

In the Colta area, the operation of IERAC, the Ministry of Agriculture and other state agencies dealing with storage and commercialisation of agricultural products, irrigation and water management, and credit and technical assistance, are evidence of this expansion of the state bureaucratic structure. In order to get access to the means of production, the Colta peasants now help to maintain a superstructure of state officials, lawyers and other intermediaries. Already Marx had noticed for the nineteenth-century French peasantry: 'By its very nature, small-holding property forms a suitable basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy' [1963: 128].

Although he wrote before the development of large bureaucratic structures, Marx also recognised the ideological role of bureaucracy, accusing it of mystifying private interests under the mask of defending the 'universal' interests of the state [Avineri 1970: 51; O'Malley 1979: *loc.*]. But in the Marxist tradition, Gramsci elaborates more explicitly bureaucratic and technological rationality as an integral part of the more general problem of bourgeois hegemonic ideology. In his notes on 'Americanism and Fordism', Gramsci clearly considers bureaucratic structures as sources of cultural ideological domination which obfuscate class and power relations [1971: 277-316].

The ideological, mystifying functions are carried out in the actual dealings between the Indian peasants and the IERAC *Mestizo* bureaucracy. Agricultural engineers, community workers and other IERAC officials share ideological definitions of what constitutes 'progressive agriculture', 'adequate land management', 'modern efficient techniques', and 'civilised forms of co-operation'. By implication, and often quite explicitly, they regard as 'ignorant', 'retrograde,' and 'deficient' all indigenous forms of co-operation and management of the ecology. These ideological confrontations have strongly

influenced the ways in which both peasants and IERAC officials have experienced several of the conflicts over land and other issues. An example will serve to illustrate this point.

In one of the *ex-haciendas*, now administered by IERAC, only a long strike, and finally a land invasion by the peasants, forced IERAC to grant them the land titles for their *huasipungos* on the terms defined by the peasants, and not on those defined by the agricultural engineers. The peasants wanted to keep several small plots at different ecological levels. The engineers wanted all parcels to be concentrated at one level in order to 'rationalise production'. IERAC blamed the conflict on 'the peasants' irrational attachment to tradition', but never reflected on the possible internal logic of that tradition. In fact, the most recent research by ethnohistorians and anthropologists in the Andean area has clearly demonstrated the rationality of the persistence of the Indian peasants' cultural practices and forms of socioeconomic organisation. They have represented very efficient forms of adaptation to the Andean ecology [Murra 1975]; a successful defence against the encroachment of power by landowners [Martinez Alier 1973], and a useful strategy against the expansion of the impersonal forces of the market [Alberti & Mayer 1974].

The state attempts to regulate the organisation of peasant production by different measures, such as land improvement schemes which involve consumption of expensive chemical fertilisers and agricultural technology, credit, and rural development programmes. Several foreign and private national development agencies, as well as European and North American volunteers, collaborate closely with the government in these projects, thus contributing to smoothing the process of capitalist ideological penetration in the rural areas. The result has been the increasing incorporation of the peasantry into the expanding commodity relations controlled by capital.

In addition, conflicts over buying and selling of land are still one of the main forms of class confrontation between peasants and remaining small landowners in the Colta region. According to the law, all these transactions should be done through the IERAC office. These agency officials then allegedly play the open, public role of 'universalistic', 'neutral' mediators between the two opposing classes. In reality, IERAC is far from being a bureaucracy working on universalistic principles. All forms of private arrangements based on paternalism, patronage, ethnic prejudice, kinship and friendship ties creep into the land settlements to obscure and reinforce existing relations of domination.⁷

If the peasants decide to protest any of these abuses through the courts, the surplus extracted from them could be even larger because they have to pay all the expenses involved in the procedures. These include lawyers' and public notaries' fees, taxes on legal papers, plus the cost of transportation for lawyers and IERAC officials whenever they have to go from Riobamba to Colta, in order to check *in situ* some aspects of the cases.

Furthermore, the wheels of modern bureaucracy in this area still move with the power of semi-feudal social relations. The Indians know that the attention

of the officials and lawyers has to be paid for with additional 'customary gifts' or *camari*. Eggs, chickens, rabbits, potatoes, etc. are regularly provided by the Indians to lawyers, public authorities, *tinterillos*, IERAC officials (including the concierge who controls the access to IERAC officials), or to anybody else who is in a situation of holding even minor power of decision-making over the peasants' cases. In one land claim I followed closely for three years, the peasant ended up paying twice the price of the land, for a plot of less than one acre.

On the other hand, the IERAC bureaucracy plays an important role in the legitimation function of the state and, by redistributing resources between capital and peasants, in controlling power and benefits. On the other hand, because of the conservative pressures from landlords and IERAC political administrators at high levels of government, the funds promised to carry out reforms in Chimborazo have not been forthcoming, and the officials have also complained about their low salaries. This situation contributes to the structural ambiguity of the class position which IERAC bureaucrats share with other unproductive workers in state enterprises. Crompton and Gubbay have argued that 'the more ambiguous a given class situation the more important will be the effect of political and ideological factors in determining the overall class position' [1977: 95-6], and 'the consciousness, attitudes and behaviour of the groups so located' [*Ibid.*: 98]. I will argue that, in this case, the IERAC bureaucrats try to resolve that structural ambiguity by clinging to an ethnic ideology which justifies their higher status ('status usurpation', in Weber's terms), and legitimises their attitudes towards the Indian peasantry and their subjective class identification with the landlords and the rising bourgeoisie.

Bourgeois ideology constructs individuals as equal, free, and abstract, isolated entities, and the state as representing the universal interests. As Marx argued, this conception implies individuals who have been freed from 'natural ties' of kinship and from personal forms of domination [1962]. In Poulantzas' view, juridical individualism is the dominant component of present capitalist ideology, which best represents individuals as separate from their class, entering into free contractual relations [1975: 213-4]. By freeing the peasants from forced labour, and by giving them access to private property, the political process and the agrarian reform have created the conditions by which these 'free individuals' can now defend their rights to land by due process of law. Confrontations between peasants and landlords, previously carried out through the practices of 'personalism' and 'patronage' within the confines of the *hacienda*, are now transformed into public, legal problems. To be able to deal with them, the individual peasant has to go through the routine practices of bureaucratic administration. Directly, these practices are not mediated by persons, but by the written word, the actions and rules objectified in the dossier, in a language over which - in the best of cases - the peasants have only oral command. In order to cope with these situations, they seek the services of lawyers. The latter have become yet another intermediary between the peasants and their access to the means of production (land, credits, etc.). Like the priest in the traditional form of

domination, the lawyers monopolise the knowledge of the occult and its rituals [*de Tocqueville 1945: 287*], and advise the peasants on what they can and ought to do. Like the IERAC officials, the *mestizo* and white lawyers share the traditional definition of ethnicity upheld by the conservative landlords in Chimborazo.

As all other social practices, legal practices operate within a time and a space which are also ideologically structured. An example of how ethnic ideology structures space and time in legal practices will illustrate my point on ideological articulation.

In Riobamba, where lawyers' offices are located, Saturday is the day informally reserved for the peasants' cases (because it coincides with market day). Unlike other days of the week, when whites or *Mestizos* consult lawyers 'in private', on Saturdays the offices are packed with Indian peasants. There is no room for private discussions. Every particular case being dealt with between lawyer and client is necessarily overheard by everyone else. Because, as I argued before, in the ethnic ideology Indians are imaged as half-persons, there can be no concern for their privacy, since 'privacy can only develop out of the prior ideological concept of "full, autonomous persons", "capable of self-development"' [*see Lukes 1973: 133 et passim*].

A similar argument can be made with respect to the ideological structuring of time. Indians are always asked to wait for hours, and even days, in queues outside the lawyers' and other public offices. If a non-Indian comes in, he/she never respects the queue, nor is asked to wait. There is a 'commodity-valuation' of their time [*Thompson 1967: 95*]; the Indians' time, however, can be wasted because Indians are regarded as 'lazy' and 'indolent'. The peasants are very conscious of this form of discrimination. They make a clear distinction between 'Quichua time' and '*mistis (mestizo)* time': the first implies waiting as a 'leisurely social activity', or time given as a 'service to the community', whereas the second is time imposed from above, which leaves them no choice, the time of domination.

In my discussion so far I have tried to elucidate some of the consequences of capitalist penetration in Colta, and the role played by certain ideological practices in the extraction and appropriation of the peasants' surplus. I shall now turn my attention to the second question posed in the introduction: how can we understand the fact that many peasants in this area are now evangelical Protestants, in relation to that process of change brought about by capitalism?

Protestantism and Ethnic Consciousness

I have mentioned already the importance of the agrarian reform and the ideological changes of the Catholic church in laying the ground for the penetration of Protestantism in Chimborazo in the late 1960s. Its further growth in the early 1970s may be accounted for by the fact that the North American missionaries translated the New Testament into the Quichua dialect of the region. Without discounting the religious significance of this

new development, I want to present two quotes to illustrate how linguistic forms help to structure our perception of the world and become the formal embodiment of ideologies, in this case ethnic ideology. At the time the translation appeared, one of the missionaries reported the reaction of a Quichua peasant as follows: 'This is our language, God is speaking to us. God actually loves the Indian as well as the Spanish (*sic*)' [quoted in *Klassen* 1974: 72]. In 1974, a *mestizo* merchant woman communicated to me her indignation at the sight of an Indian carrying a Bible, in these terms: 'Imagine! Now the savages are going to be able to talk directly to God, and in *that* language!'

Because the missionaries started by converting the Indians, when they achieved a certain degree of success it was quite predictable that – if they ever attempted it – they were going to fail among the *mestizo* and white populations. Up to 1979, Protestantism was primarily an 'Indian phenomenon' in this region.

In the folk version of Catholicism professed by the Quichuas before conversion, they used the cult of the saints and that of the 'regional' Virgin to reach the supernatural forces which they perceived as dominating them. The *fiesta* complex involved religious ceremonies, ritual drinking and elaborate dances. Through a complex system of formal ranked offices of ritual sponsorship, the *fiesta* was a stage for the enactment of social, political and economic roles by the whole peasant community. Ceremonial redistribution helped to strengthen ties of kinship and fictive kinship. The most explicit purpose of the different *fiestas* was to exert pressure on God's intermediaries to obtain benefits for the entire group (good harvests, rain, protection for the animals, etc.).

In contrast, Protestantism focuses on an individualised religious experience. In the new ideology, the intermediaries are considered 'powerless wooden idols'. The individual, now primarily responsible for his relationship with God, has to become 'worthy' of His mercy by observing a series of taboos which will turn his/her body into a 'clean temple' where Christ can dwell. In actual everyday practices, this has resulted in the Quichuas' concern for external cleanliness, total abstention from tobacco and alcohol, the avoidance of extra-marital sexual relations, and a more forward presentation of the self *vis-à-vis* non-Indians. Self-control, and freedom from behaviour which is now regarded as degrading, are the bases for their newly acquired self-respect and dignity. This new ethnic image represents a rejection of the previous relations of domination under which the Indians were literally treated as beasts of burden and less than human. Both the emphasis on education (which started with a desire to read the Bible), and that on speaking 'proper' Quichua (without Spanishisms) have become important means by which Protestant peasants enact their ethnic identity. Formal schooling is a new symbol of prestige, especially among young peasants. They regard it as a tool which will allow them to confront those who previously had a monopoly over the institutions of ideological creation and maintenance (means of communication, education and religious interpretation).

The Quichuas also perceive the revalorisation of their language as a way of strengthening their identity *vis-à-vis* whites and *mestizos*. The hegemony of Spanish, established as a fact of conquest, has persisted because the Spanish-speaking dominant classes continue to use it to reproduce the present relations of domination. Spanish is the language of the bureaucracy, the markets, the schools, and the cities; consequently, every social and economic advancement for the Indians is mediated by their knowledge of Spanish [Muratorio 1979].

As I have explained elsewhere [Muratorio, *in press*], this new form of ethnic consciousness is not devoid of ambiguities. 'Cleanliness', 'education', 'a united family' and 'an enterprising personality' are all values equally cherished by *mestizos* and whites. However, the Quichuas do not seek a *mestizo* identity as such; indeed, *mestizos* are despised by most Indians, who usually refer to them as rude and vulgar. Yet the patterns of behaviour inspired by Protestantism, the very basis of their new Quichua identity, may lead them toward assimilation. In a way, in the context of the dominant ideology these traits represent the image of 'what a civilised Indian should be'. Before discussing this problem further it is necessary to explain the characteristics of the present state ideology on ethnicity.

The organising principle of the state ideology is 'nationalism' and 'national development'. However, neither civilian nor military governments have up to now seriously challenged Ecuador's economic dependence on international monopoly capital, nor the situation of internal colonialism of the white minority over the Indian and Afro-American sectors of the population.

As Vilar [1979] argues for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, in Ecuador the linkage between state and nationhood develops with the need of the bourgeoisie to create a unified national market and to centralise its control over resources (especially oil in the Amazon region). In ethnic terms, the state defines all the members of the national society as *Mestizos*. By assuming that all citizens have equal rights in a homogeneous national society, the ideology of *mestizaje* denies the existence of factual differences of class and ethnicity. In this way, the state attempts to neutralise all possible oppositional ideologies by following policies of assimilation and often of straight-forward ethnocide [Whitten 1976, 1978; Robinson 1972].

In several ceremonial occasions in which the evangelical peasants confront local and national state authorities as a group, their demands for better roads, better schools, modern medical care (to do away with witch-doctors), or for electricity and sewage, do not present a serious challenge to the 'modernising' goals of the state. Rather, they assure the state authorities that the Protestant Quichuas are 'respectful citizens' who want to become acculturated by working within the existing institutions. Furthermore, the Quichuas' presentation of self on these occasions is almost a caricature of their cultural characteristics. They parade in 'typical costume', prepare 'typical food' for the authorities, and present them with all kinds of 'typical gifts'. This form of ethnic consciousness I have referred to as 'alienated folkloric consciousness'. As such, it has already been incorporated into bourgeois ideology as a

nostalgia for an exotic Indian past, and frozen into museums. It has also been actually incorporated into the capitalist market, because it is sold in tourist packages which include visits to different Indian groups and 'typical' Indian markets.

Moreover, the political ideology of this version of Protestantism to which the Quichuas have been converted has been up to now considerably conservative. When asked about their role in possible confrontations with the national and provincial authorities, the answers of the Protestant leaders have been invariably an abbreviated version of Paul's Epistle to the Romans (Chp. 13: 1-2): 'The authorities have been established by God and should be respected'.

Internally in the communities, several peasants were punished by the indigenous Protestant pastors for having taken ex-landlords to court in cases involving disputes over land or back wages. The pastors construed that action as 'scandalous' in the Biblical sense. The sanctions consisted of isolating the peasants from the religious community, and in not allowing them to use the local radio station for preaching, singing or greeting their kin. In the cases I followed closely, the sanctions did not prevent the peasants from demanding their rights. However, they showed a consistent political conservatism at least on the part of the old leaders.

The Association of Evangelical Peasants of Chimborazo (AIECH) was constituted in 1967. It groups all native churches in the province and is the political organisation which the evangelical peasants use for their dealings with the state and other institutions. It was successful in obtaining the right of 'freedom of religion' for the *evangelicos* when they were harassed by Catholics in the 1960s. It provides religious and community services. However, at least until 1978, it was not an organisation involved in advancing the class interests of the peasants in relation to landlords or the state.

My caution in putting a date to this observation is justified at least on two counts: a) the phenomenon of the peasants' conversion to Protestantism is still quite recent, and b) the penetration of capitalism, and present political developments, are rapidly changing class relations and political organisations in this area of Chimborazo. Therefore, the particular ways in which ethnic identity is going to be enacted or manipulated will depend on concrete situations of inter-ethnic contact which develop out of the changing relations of production. Indian peasants, Indian proletarians, and Indian petty merchants may act out their ethnic identity in very different ways *vis-à-vis* other classes. I now therefore turn to the discussion of Protestantism in the context of intra- and inter-class relations.

Protestantism and class

The process of agrarian change which turned the *haciendas* into *minifundios* has not resulted in a polarisation between a class of 'kulaks' and another composed of agricultural wage labourers. Instead, the peasants have been atomised as a class by tiny differences in their plots and by their increasing

participation in the commodity markets. They still defend their access to land because they perceive land as the basis of their social and economic survival as well as that of their children. Continuous subdivision of the *minifundios* by inheritance has aggravated the already serious problems of land erosion and over-use, which constitute serious barriers for technical agricultural improvements and prevent capital accumulation.

The penetration of the capitalist market for commodities has produced the dissolution of family small handicraft industries. Increasingly, peasant reproduction includes the consumption of commodities. However, the labour withdrawn from use-value production cannot be employed in the production of cash crops due to scarcity of land and soil erosion. In order to get cash, peasants restrict their own consumption and sell a portion of their crops in the local markets. Their relations with merchants and money lenders usually lead to a cycle of indebtedness. In order to cope with this situation of impoverishment, the peasant households follow two strategies which are closely interrelated: a) they increase their reciprocity arrangements with other peasants, and b) they send away members of the household in search of wage labour or as petty traders. It is in relation to these strategies that Protestantism is now playing an interesting role.

When the Quichuas were Catholics, they used relationships of *compadrazgo* as a way of extending their reciprocity network. These relationships were made sacred, and consequently strengthened, through the sacraments of baptism and marriage. The GMU version of Protestantism has eliminated the godparents for baptism, and usually the parents of the groom are now selected as godparents for marriage. Because the need for extra-family labour persists and the peasants are short of cash, they use the relationship of 'brother in the faith' (*hermanos*) to enjoy the same economic and social advantages previously obtained from *compadres*. The reasons the Quichuas give for these preferences are similar to those formerly given for selecting *compadres*: 'they can be trusted', they act like real brothers', and 'they are willing to share'. In addition, some of the 'Protestant virtues' are now added to the explanation: 'they are more honest', 'they work harder', and 'they don't drink and are more reliable'.

One important consequence of the men's seasonal migration has been to leave the bulk of the agricultural activities in the hands of women, children and the older men in the communities. The shortage of labour forces women to try to engage other women in reciprocal exchanges of labour for harvesting, and mules and donkeys for threshing and transportation. In addition, in order to continue to have access to other ecological levels, women have retained or renewed share-cropping arrangements with other families living in the high plateau. They share seeds, animals for ploughing, labour, and the harvest on a fifty-fifty basis. When the people from the *paramo* come down to the lower communities, they are offered food, lodging and other services, and are entrusted with the care of sheep to graze on the high altitude fields. Increasingly, 'brothers in Christ' are sought and trusted for these reciprocal exchanges. Several traditional practices – such as food exchanges and ritual

visiting – continue to be performed, now under the form of Protestant rituals such as the ‘family and neighbourhood’ *cultos* (services). They serve to confirm and sanctify the ‘new sibling’ relationship.

The participation of the Colta peasants in the labour market is not as fully-fledged proletarians. For example, 70 per cent of the migrants from the community of Majipamba work as itinerant vendors, selling fruit, clothing, handicrafts and lottery tickets; 30 per cent work as *cargadores* (carriers), or performing other occasional services; and only 5 per cent work as wage labourers – agricultural peons in the neighbourhood, or longshoremen and plantation workers in the coastal estates. With great reluctance, the poorest families are starting to send their daughters to work in domestic service or as carriers in the urban markets. This is the kind of ‘marginal labour’ which helps in maintaining the artificially high standard of living of the bourgeoisie in Ecuador, and in many other Latin American countries [see *Stavenhagen 1978: 35*].

Protestantism has also enlarged the reciprocity network of the Quichua migrants in the big cities, and wherever their jobs may take them. They can obtain room and board cheaper – and sometimes for free – if they lodge with *hermanos*. If need be, merchandise can also be left with them because ‘they can be trusted’. Even those migrants who work as wage-earners in the coastal plantations or in sugar mills have established a system of ‘substitutes’ between *hermanos* by which they will replace one another in the job when one of them returns to the countryside to take care of his plot. In a labour market where supply exceeds demand, the relationship of *hermano* is used as a form of job security. Other urban services provided by *hermanos* include lodging for Colta children who can afford to attend secondary schools, company for those peasants who occasionally have some business in the IERAC central offices in Quito and, most importantly, a ‘Protestant support community’ in the ‘hostile city’. In exchange, the peasants in Colta send *cuis*, potatoes, barley and other products, and cultivate the plots of those who now work permanently in the city. In these ways, the peasant sector of the economy cheapens the cost of the reproduction of the urban labour force.

My data do not suggest that Protestantism is directly related to an internal differentiation of the peasants in this region. The majority of evangelical peasants do not have a standard of living noticeably higher than non-Protestant peasants. The virtues emphasised by the Protestant ethic are not new to peasants who have always lived close to subsistence. Furthermore, Protestant peasants do not save, but try to spend whatever cash they may have on education, modern medicines, zinc roofs, radios, bicycles and taperecorders. What Protestantism has done is to remove the social pressures for ceremonial consumption; as Wolf argues, when the peasants escape those demands they may reduce ceremonial consumption as one of the possible strategies to achieve economic betterment for their families [1966: 14–5]. The peasants changed their consumption patterns from what the new ideology defines as ‘pagan’, ‘extravagant’ and ‘wasteful’ to what the same ideology regards as ‘responsible’ and ‘proper’ consumption. These consumption pat-

terms put Protestant peasants somewhat ahead of non-Protestant peasants in terms of their ties with the market introduced in Ecuador by international monopoly capitalism. However, differential patterns of consumption do not constitute a basis for class relations.

Some poorer peasants in Colta have been forced to enter into share-tenancy contracts with ex-peasants who have now become full-time merchants. They own the land and extract a form of labour rent from the peasants, while all the risks remain with the latter. Unlike the other share-cropping arrangement 'between brothers', such contracts with petty merchants are regarded as highly exploitative by the peasants. In Colta these merchants are known as *los latifundistas* (the large landowners), not because they have large extensions of land, but because they refuse the practices of sharing and reciprocity, they refuse to 'lend a hand'. However, there are very few cases of this type of internal class differentiation. Other attempts by slightly better-off peasants to exploit the labour of their fellow peasants have been fiercely opposed by the *cabecilla* (leader) in Majipamba, who is probably the only 'true traditional' leader still remaining in the region. He has acquired his prestige through more than thirty years of disinterested service to the community, even at the risk of his own life. He acts as the arbiter of most internal disputes, backs the demands of poorer members of the community, and is responsible for enforcing the community obligations with the state, and for the organisation of all communal work. In exchange, the members of the community help him cultivate his land and occasionally bring him offerings of food. Like the old *kuraka* of pre-Columbian times [see Spalding 1974], he is the representative of the community and the guardian of the social norms. However, he has learned the ropes of the new bureaucratic structure very well, and his reputation as 'the wise Indian who speaks like a doctor' is feared even by lawyers and IERAC officials in the area.

This example lends me to some concluding remarks on the problems of 'tradition' and 'consciousness' among Indian peasants. They are offered as a contribution to an intellectual tradition in peasant studies started by Eric Wolf and Sidney Mintz and by Raymond Williams in Marxist cultural theory.

Commenting on a definition of 'culture' by Wolf, which stresses the dynamic elements in human action, and the historical character of cultural forms, Mintz has this to add about 'traditional culture' among peasants.

In peasant societies, 'blind custom' is neither blind nor customary, and the differential distribution of power, wealth and status will affect the uses of patterned behaviour, as well as the meanings for those who engage in it [1973: 97].

In an attempt to reintroduce the concept of 'tradition' in Marxist cultural thought, Williams suggests that:

What we have to see is not just 'a tradition' but a *selective tradition*: an intentionally selective version of a shaping past and a pre-shaped pre-

sent, which is then powerfully operative in the process of social and cultural definition and identification [1977: 115, *emphasis in the original*]. In this paper, I have focused on the economic and ideological aspects of the articulation of the peasantry and capitalism. On the one hand, I have argued that in the actual practices of establishing capitalist social relations and ideological hegemony in the countryside, the dominant classes in Ecuador have selectively incorporated meanings, values, and conceptions of ethnicity from the 'traditional' social formation. On the other hand, I have attempted to explain how Protestant peasants have responded to the changing conditions by reshaping their own tradition. They have retained access to the means of production; kinship and family obligations continue to be important both as relations of production and in providing all the security functions, such as caring for the young, the sick and the old. However, these traditional relations of reciprocity are enacted in the new ideological and ritual forms of Protestantism, despite the individualism fostered by this religious ideology. In the case of the migrants, the traditional links they maintain with the rural communities can be regarded as a defence mechanism. They provide the migrants with a cushion from the new forms of class exploitation they experience in the cities, especially in a labour market which is structured in terms of both class and ethnicity.

It has been my argument that Protestantism should be examined in the context of the changing relations of production. Up to now, the forms of consciousness generated by Protestantism have not led to the advancement of the peasants' class interests. Some recent political developments – reported to me by Colta peasants in December 1979 – may start to change this picture. Three of these developments are particularly significant: 1) the granting of voting rights to illiterates has re-activated the political organisations of indigenous peasants, and the existing political parties have become more active in Chimborazo; 2) in one of the *haciendas* of the area, more than a thousand peasants, including Protestants, went on strike for wage demands; 3) at the initiative of the newly elected government of President Roldós, delegates from Indian groups from the highland, coastal and Amazon regions met in Colta to discuss a government proposal for the formation of an Institute of Indian Nationalities. Protestant leaders from Colta were present at that meeting, and discussions were going on in the communities about the possibilities of the Indian organisations having a major role in the planning and running of the Institute. Access to land for the highland peasants and for the Amazon Indian groups threatened by colonisation were two of the most hotly debated issues.

Initiatives and actions such as these could constitute a firm basis for the development of oppositional forms of consciousness, where a redefined ethnic identity and class interests articulate in new ways. However, these developments should be examined taking into consideration the 'neutralising' effects of possible government manipulation, and the divisive activities of rival Catholic and Protestant missionaries who proselytise among all of these groups.

NOTES

1. The bulk of the research on which this paper is based was conducted in Chimborazo between 1975 and 1978. It was generously supported by two Canada Council grants, nos. S75-0111 and S76-1199. Since then, I have visited the area twice in 1979. I also want to acknowledge my debt to the Department of Anthropology of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Quito for their support. The interpretations and conclusions of this essay are, nevertheless, my exclusive responsibility. Some of the issues raised in the second part of this paper are also discussed in Muratorio [*in press*].
2. Although I do not intend to enter here into the 'mode of production debate', I want to clarify that I use the concept of 'mode of production' in this paper to refer to the totality of social relations and human practices in a given socioeconomic formation (which will combine at least two modes of production). In Marx and Engels' terms, I refer to the mode of production as a 'definite mode of life' [1947: 7]. Following the more recent Marxist literature on the subject [Anderson 1974: 403-4; Thompson 1978: 352; Godelier 1978; Williams 1977: 92], I explicitly make the point of including ethnicity, religious beliefs, values, norms, law, symbolic forms of domination and resistance, in sum, institutions and ideologies as constitutive elements of the mode of production, as they appear in the peasants' everyday social and cultural practices. I will agree with E. P. Thompson, that, in order to get away from empty abstractions, we need to return to the concept of 'human experience', by which:

Men and women also return as subjects, within this term not as autonomous subjects, 'free individuals', but as persons experiencing their determinate productive situations and relationships, as needs and interests and as antagonisms, and then 'handling' this experience within their *consciousness* and their *culture* . . . in the most complex (yes, 'relatively autonomous') ways, and then (often but not always through the ensuing structures of class) acting upon their determinate situation in their turn. [1978: 356, *emphasis in the original*]

- 'Ideologies' are understood as elements (e.g. ideas, beliefs, values, images), or as structured and more articulate complexes of elements (e.g. Protestantism, liberalism), which are integral to all conscious social practices (economic, religious, legal, political, etc.). As all forms of meaning, ideologies emerge from social relations in particular historical contexts, but they are not mere reflexes of those relations, nor are they necessarily tied into one-to-one relationships with the latter. For example, ideologies generated in religious practices may penetrate economic practices, as Weber's thesis argued, or vice versa. Unlike early capitalism, its corporate version has a tendency to colour all other social practices with ideologies generated in its economic practices (as in the notion of 'you are as beautiful as the latest product you consume').
3. Scott [1976] provides an excellent discussion of this point in his work on the sugar-cane cutters in northern Peru.
 4. In his theoretical analysis of fascist and populist ideologies, Laclau [1977] uses the concept of 'articulation of ideological elements' in very interesting ways. I have borrowed the concept of 'ideological articulation' from his work. However, we differ in several theoretical points.
 5. Here I refer to the efforts of Amazonian groups, such as the Shuar, who have been able to establish the most successful Indian Federation in Ecuador. They are fighting for their land, and for retaining their cultural identity. They are also helping other groups (Cayapas, Quichuas, Záparos and Waorani) to organise similar organisations.
 6. I use the term 'aristocratic racism' in the context of the semi-feudal *hacienda*, in order to distinguish this kind of racist ideology from that which develops in plantation systems, under capitalist relations of production.
 7. Similar observations have been made by Norman E. Whitten, Jr. in his extensive work on the Canelos Quichua, where he discusses the relationship of this indigenous group with the bureaucracy which operates in the Ecuadorian Oriente [see especially 1978: 58-9].

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