

**FACULTAD LATINOAMERICANA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES
SEDE ECUADOR
DEPARTAMENTO DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES Y COMUNICACIÓN
CONVOCATORIA 2013-2015**

**TESIS PARA OBTENER EL TÍTULO DE MAestrÍA EN RELACIONES
INTERNACIONALES CON MENCIÓN EN NEGOCIACIÓN Y
COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL**

**THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN ALLYING
RESPECTIVELY WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN SINCE 2000**

ANKUR MEHROTRA

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DEDICATION

To my parents, brother and my beloved, Andrea.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the interests of the United States and China in allying respectively with India and Pakistan since 2000. It does so from a realist perspective and uses a qualitative methodology, including the collection and analysis of data from official sources, such as academic articles, magazines, newspapers, think tanks and books. The turn of the century brought structural changes in the global scenario. The United States pivoted to Asia and forged a new alliance with India in order to maintain its global power and hegemony creating a new alliance with India. In particular, China's mammoth rise became a cause of concern for the United States. I argue that the United States has had three main interests for forging an alliance with India: to maintain its economic power, to contain China and to combat terrorism. Importantly, the two first interests can be understood from a balance-of-power perspective. Meanwhile, China has maintained a strong alliance with Pakistan in order to repeal the United States attempt to encircle it, and to gain regional as well as global leadership. From a balance-of-power perspective China's main interests in allying with Pakistan are thus the containment of India as an emerging regional power and the maintenance of its regional leadership.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the interests of the United States in allying with India and those of China in allying with Pakistan since 2000. The India-Pakistan conflict has gained worldwide attention over the years and is currently one of the chief reasons for the absence of peace in the subcontinent. It is thus important to understand the involvement of non-regional actors in the India-Pakistan conflict and comprehend the interests of these outside actors in allying with conflict parties in order to achieve peace in South Asia. While the violent partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947 led to this conflict, we need new lenses to understand the role of the United States (US) and China in this dispute. This thesis therefore hopes to make a meaningful contribution to the field of International Relations, which not only has long been preoccupied by this interstate conflict but also is ever more looking at emerging powers, such as China and India.

The rivalry between India and Pakistan has been one of the most critical and enduring crises of the international arena. Immediately after India's independence from the British colonial rule and Pakistan's secession, hostility began to escalate and now after almost 70 years the situation remains the same. The identity crisis by both India as a Hindu nation and Pakistan as a Muslim nation has given fire to this conflict and allowed the involvement of non-regional actors, such as United States and China, to satisfy their own interests and those of India and Pakistan.

Each time the tension rises, or a war breaks down between these two giants of the South Asian subcontinent, an external authority has and had to intervene in order to restore peace and maintain harmony. A few examples to demonstrate this could be the role of the UN Security Council in the first war between India and Pakistan in 1948, or the war of 1965, Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, after which the Tashkent agreement with the diplomatic help of Soviet Union and US was framed. Another one is the liberation of East Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh in 1971 in which two blocks competed, the first one including China, the US and the United Kingdom (UK) in support of Pakistan, and the other one made up of Russia and India (Shrivastava, 2011).

Many of the previous studies on India-Pakistan conflict have focused on the relationship between the two countries through a realist or a liberal perspective, explaining it through power politics. Whereas this study uses a neorealist perspective

and therefore considers power politics to be important, it places emphasis on another key aspect of the conflict: the role of external powers, including, on the one hand, the United States as the world superpower, and, on the other hand, China as one of the fastest growing economic and military power. By doing so, it hopes to make a meaningful contribution to the understanding of the role and interests of key non-regional actors in an interstate conflict.

The India-Pakistan Conflict

The conflict between India and Pakistan arose forthwith India's independence from the British Empire and its partition in 1947. Although more than 67 years have passed since the partition, the conflict level remains significant. It may be considered as one of the most critical and perpetual crisis of the planet. Soon after the partition clashes started as a result of boundary disputes over Kashmir, budget and military allotted for the development of the newly independent Pakistan. The dispute grew fiercer and later resulted in wars between the two neighbors. The use of cross-border terrorism has also been doubted for many political objectives. Including such non-traditional tools in the foreign policy of both India and Pakistan led to four different wars and other disputes. This rivalry did not to come to an end with the wars of 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and the Kargil war of 1999 in which both sides suffered huge losses of lives and property. Since childhood many Indians and Pakistanis have heard tormenting stories about the conflict between these two giants of the South Asian subcontinent, and grown amidst accusations against citizens from the other country. This has contributed to generate a feeling of hatred between citizens of the two bordering states.

In this thesis I will analyze the interests of the US and China in this conflict from a neorealist perspective. Kenneth Waltz (1979) put such a perspective forward most prominently in the year 1979 in his book *Theory of International Politics*. According to neorealism, states tend to go to war, to dominate and to exert their power on other states. War may occur at any time and all the states must be prepared for such situations. And among states, anarchy or the absence of a government, is associated with the occurrence of violence. Neorealism tries to explain how states, both weak and powerful, function and how they interact with each other in the international community. In international relations, neorealism attempts to make clear war, the avoidance of war, power balancing, power seeking, the death of states, security

competition and arms races and alliance formation (Waltz, 1979).

We are using neorealism for two basic reasons. First, it clarifies the conflict between two states by making innuendoes to the latent source of the conflict. Secondly, in spite of its ample use in understanding inter-state conflict it has not been used properly to comprehend this particular conflict. This peculiar theory tries to approach the conflict in the framework of the world system. This structural theory emphasizes the repercussion of the world system on nations and the fallout of the alliance between two states (Rajagopalan, 1998).

India gained independence from the colonial British rule on 15th August 1947 but the British wanted to create a federal state according to the populations of the major religions. The Muslims wanted a different sovereign state, which ultimately led to the creation of Pakistan. The major Indian party at the time, the Indian National Congress (INC) led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawahar Lal Nehru wanted a consolidated and undivided nation with solid principles. But, frightened and threatened by the large Hindu population many Muslim leaders demanded for a separate state assuring the rights of the Muslim minority (Paul, 2006). The rivalry initiated then. Thousands of Hindus and Muslims died during the violent clashes of the partition and during the migrations of Hindus and the Muslims from India to Pakistan and vice versa. After the partition the sentiment of disdain was noticeable on both sides. The primary reason was the sense of superiority of one religion over the other. The spark finally went off in October 1947 over the princely territory of Jammu & Kashmir, when militants began to operate and later by the Pakistani Army established a presence in Jammu & Kashmir (BBC, 1948).

The modern territory of Jammu and Kashmir has been the source of conflict not only with Pakistan but with China too. In 1965, the same boundary dispute led to another war with Pakistan. The Pakistani armed forces entered the Indian territory and in response India crossed the international borders. Thousands of soldiers lost their lives in the war. After three weeks the parties reached a ceasefire agreement and committed to the Tashkent declaration (BBC, 1965). In 1971, Pakistan plunged to civil war after the citizens of East Pakistan demanded for a separate sovereign state. India interfered and supported the rebellion. East Pakistan was then liberated and the People's Republic of Bangladesh was formed (BBC, 1971). In 1999, a full-fledged war transpired between India and Pakistan over the state of Jammu & Kashmir. But this time India retaliated in a befitting way, with air strikes at the enemy territory on account of Pakistan's alleged

invasion of Indian domain. This led to a direct engagement between the two countries, and tens of thousands of people were forced to flee their homes. India won the battle with great human and material losses (BBC, 1999). These wars show the ever-existing rivalry between India and Pakistan, while Kashmir has been the hottest point of conflict between India and Pakistan.

Of the two rival countries, Pakistan has been weaker. Because of this rationale, it has tried to keep matching India's might or, in other words, to balance the unevenness of power. This unevenness is one of the causes behind this everlasting conflict. According to T.V. Paul, "Power asymmetry is one of the big reasons for the unending conflict" (Paul, 2006: 601). India has shown greater economic, material and military power. If we take a look at some of these aspects, we can see the disparity between the two neighbors. India's population was nearly seven times larger than that of Pakistan in 2014. More Muslims lived in India than in Pakistan. The economy of India was eight times bulkier than Pakistan and it was much more industrialized. Also, if we look at the military capability, India's military expenditure was almost six times that of Pakistan; and military manpower was six times as large as Pakistan's (FindTheData, 2014). Besides Indian military was much better equipped and trained, being one of the top five most powerful armies of the world (Mizokami, 2014). Pakistan's economy has tried to bridge this difference, but it overburdens its gross domestic product by investing a lot in its military in its struggle to overcome this asymmetry.

Several attempts at forging peace between India and Pakistan failed. New conflicts cropped up and replaced the old resolved ones. The talks between the then prime ministers of India and Pakistan, Nehru and Ali, in 1951 led to an improved situation in 1953. Both prime ministers met together in England and tried to iron out some of the important issues. But things worsened when Pakistan tried to sign a defense treaty with the United States following clear-cut admonitions from the Indian Prime Minister. The US defense treaty showed clearly that to Pakistan it mattered more the balancing of power than its relationship with India (Rajagopalan, 1999). One of the hottest and most dangerous debates over the Indus river system was resolved between India and Pakistan in 1960. But it could not bring peace for a long time between India and Pakistan. The Tashkent agreement of 1965 signed in the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Simla agreement of 1971 raised hope of a better relationship between the two countries but resulted to be short-lived (Rajagopalan, 1999).

Research Design

This thesis analyzes the interests of the United States in allying with India and those of China with Pakistan since 2000. The primary interests of the United States in allying with India since 2000 that are examined in this thesis are to contain China maintain its economic prowess and curb terrorism. On the other hand, the main interests of China in allying with Pakistan since 2000 are to contain India and its allies and gain regional and global leadership.

The two case studies, namely the interests of the US in allying with India, and the interests of China in allying with Pakistan, are topical given the incessant rise of China over the past years, which has generated structural changes in Asia and has impinged on the India-Pakistan conflict dynamics. Pakistan, which had been a good ally both to the United States and China, gradually saw its relations with the United States deteriorating. As India is in conflict with both Pakistan and China, the United States came to consider India as the only country that can deter China from gaining regional and global hegemony. It started to mend its relationship with India to use it against China's rise and to curb terrorist activities on Pakistani soil with India's help. Additionally, this particular case study bears an important relevance for the field of international relations.

The study examines the interests of the United States and China in allying respectively with India and Pakistan since 2000. In so doing, it provides valuable data about regional power distribution, great power politics, territorial divisions, the nuclear weapons factor, and clashing national interests. Most of the research A key point of (neo)realism this research: power. Indeed, in order to preserve its power, the United States changed sides and befriended India to contain China, while China strengthened its relationship with Pakistan in order to deter the United States from overpowering it.

Apart from conclusive empirical data, this research also highlights that (neo)realism can still explain international politics in a credible way. Balance of power continues to influence international politics and states do temporarily forge alliances with other like-minded states to counter or contain a third emerging country. Neoclassical realism, a mix of classical realism and neorealism, is particularly helpful in understanding the two case studies. My theoretical framework is therefore based on a combination of neorealism and neoclassical realism. Neorealism and neoclassical realism are used to analyze the different interests of the United States and China in the

current investigation. Neorealism is more appropriate than neoliberalism in this case because security matters supersede cooperation and the two strategic alliances can be explained in terms of balance of power. Likewise, balance-of-power theory is relevant because it explains the occasional and regular appearances of non-regional actors in the India-Pakistan conflict and enables us to understand the United States and China's interests in allying with the conflict parties. Neoclassical realism brings particularly useful insights into other aspects of the United States and China foreign policies, such as their interests in curbing terrorism.

This research uses a qualitative methodology, as it aims to give an in-depth understanding of the interests of the United States and China, rather than trying to determine general patterns. As qualitative methods focus on giving text-based answers, usually based on historical reflections, events and processes, it suits the purpose of this research. Additionally, this research has a holistic perspective where emphasis is not laid on single variables, but rather on the whole, thus placing the analysis in a historical, as well as social context (Vromen, 2012). The critical revision of the literature has been instrumental for the development of the whole research. Indeed, in order to analyze the military, economic and political interests of the United States and China in allying respectively with India and Pakistan, I used texts in a cognitive manner to put the observations in a context, and maintain them as a foundation open for interpretation.

The data collection for this research was performed via secondary sources, including academic journals and magazines, such as, *Journal of International Affairs*, *South Asian Studies*, *International Political Science Review*, *International Security*, *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy*. The journals and magazines selected stem from all over the world and constantly publish papers and articles concerning the US and China foreign policies. All of them are useful and trusted sources.

In addition, Wikileaks provided first-hand data on the United States policy toward India and Pakistan and also the view of the United States on China's ascension. The reports of various renowned think tanks, such as Conciliation Resources, The Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations, The International Institute for Strategic Studies and International Crisis Group, complemented these sources and helped to contrast the data.

Furthermore, the documentary analysis included books written by eminent authors who are experts on the foreign policies of United States and China and about the India-Pakistan conflict, such as Stephen P. Cohen, T.V. Paul, Sumit Ganguly, J.N.

Dixit, Shashank Joshi, Rahul Roy Chaudhary, Brahma, Chellaney, B.M. Jain, Zhang Li, Rajesh Rajagopalan, Jaswant Singh and several others. I also used articles in renowned newspapers and news agencies, such as Reuters and BBC. I used newspapers from both India and Pakistan, such as The Times of India, Hindustan Times, The Hindu, The Express Tribune, Daily Times, The Frontier Post, The Nation, The News International, as well as newspapers from the United States, China, the United Kingdom and Canada. The use of Indian and Pakistani newspapers allowed contrasting the perspectives on both sides of the conflict, and thus reducing partiality.

I also used official resources from the United States and China, such as, the CIA World Fact Book and the U.S. State Department. In summary, I used many types of trusted documentary sources about the topic of my research to crosscheck information and get an in-depth understanding of the interests of the United States and China in allying respectively with the India and Pakistan since 2000. Finally, using sources from all the four countries related to this research reduced potential biases and helped get a more accurate answer to the central question of this investigation. In addition to documentary analysis, I conducted three interviews with academic experts from the United States, China and Pakistan to improve my understanding of the US and China interests in allying respectively with India and Pakistan since 2000.

Thesis Structure

The thesis is divided into five parts. In the introduction, I present the research topic, my central research question, methodology and a historic background of the India-Pakistan conflict. In the first chapter of the thesis, the theoretical framework is explained in detail with all the important concepts that are used in the forthcoming empirical chapters. In the first empirical chapter the interests of the United States in allying with India since 2000 are discussed in detail with focus on the three main interests of the United States: to maintain its economic power, to contain China and to combat terrorism. In the same way, in the second empirical chapter, the interests of China in allying with Pakistan since 2000 are analyzed, including the containment of India as an emerging regional power and the maintenance of its regional leadership. In the last chapter, I present the conclusions of the whole research.

CHAPTER II THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter provides the theoretical framework of this thesis. It draws on neorealism, as put forward, most prominently, by Kenneth Waltz (1979) in his book *Theory of International Politics*, emphasizing the concept of ‘balance of power’, to explain the interests of United States in allying with India and those of China in allying with Pakistan since 2000. The India-Pakistan conflict is indeed the direct consequence of imbalance of power between India and Pakistan, as will be argued below. Neorealism allows us to analyze how the balance of power between India and Pakistan is affected by non-regional actors in the conflict, and the interests behind these actors’ decision to support different parties in the conflict.

Several authors do not deny a possible scenario of Cold War or even World War between China and the United States (e.g. Dyer, 2014). The World has moved from bipolarity to unipolarity after the victory of the United States in the Cold War in 1989. Waltz (2004) states, “in a bipolar world two states check and balance each other. In a unipolar world, checks on the behavior of the one great power drop drastically. Unipolarity weakens structural constraints, enlarges the field of action of the remaining great power, and increases the importance of its internal qualities” (Waltz, 2004: 4). According to Waltz, unipolarity has a deep impact on global politics. It explains the functioning of a balance-of-power strategy and formation of alliances. With the ascension of China, the United States has started to worry that it might lose supremacy. That is why it has begun to aid India, as it is the only country in the Asian continent, which can currently stop China from ascending in the current world order. “An international system in balance is like a political system of checks and balances. The impulses of a state to behave in arbitrary and high-handed fashion are constrained by the presence of states of comparable capability. An international system in which another state or combination of states is unable to balance the might of the most powerful is like a political system without checks and balances” (Waltz, 2004: 4).

This chapter will be divided into three different sections. I will begin by justifying the use of a realist approach to understand the interests of the US and China in allying respectively with India and Pakistan. I will do so by comparing realism and liberalism. I will then justify the use of neorealism, most specifically of balance-of-power theory, to understand the interest of the US in balancing China, and the interest

of China in balancing India and the US. In a subsequent section, I will complement my theoretical framework with neoclassical realism to analyze the other interests of the United States and China behind their respective alliances with India and Pakistan, and end with a review of the literature on the foreign policies of the US and China since 2000.

Realism versus Liberalism

This section compares realism and liberalism as possible theoretical perspectives from which to analyze the interests of the United States and China in allying respectively with India and Pakistan. The central argument rests on realism being more appropriate to explain such interests, and, as such, I will choose it as the main theoretical paradigm for this research. It can be easily said that realism has dominated the world of international relations for the better part of a century. Realism possess a natural home in international relations as it is widely used to describe conflicts and tension among countries. Realism portrays the world ready to be indulged in war and security competition at any moment of time (Mearsheimer, 2001).

This is particularly important because the world is transformed and retransformed by the countless number of conflicts over the centuries, with realism helping to understand the world order maintained by conflicts. The last such big one was the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union that neared to actual war. The world is one of anarchy with states competing for survival and global dominance. Another possible and probably soon-to-be reality could be a similar conflict between the United States and China. Two types of realism are used in this research: neorealism and neoclassical realism, which builds on both classical realism and neorealism. According to both perspectives, all states seek survival in an anarchic world and must do it on their own (Mearsheimer, 2001).

In the anarchic international system, state power is key and in fact is the only variable of interest that can be used by the states in order to ensure their survival. According to realism, state interests can have economic, military, and diplomatic dimensions. But, material capabilities ultimately shape the order of the international system. Realists rely on certain assumptions. Of utmost importance is the assumption according to which states continuously seek to have enough material capabilities to ensure their survival and keep on enhancing such capabilities. States are supposed to

have military capabilities and are uncertain of other states' intentions. Lastly, states with the most military and economic prowess decide the order of international politics. Consequently, powerful states try to achieve hegemony, if they can, which can also be achieved by balance of power (Slaughter, 2011).

Liberalism, on the other hand, is a theory based on the peaceful coexistence of nations. It emphasizes that nations can survive shoulder to shoulder within a stable and ordered international system. Its foremost concepts are self-restraint, moderation, compromise and peace. Liberal thinkers believe in international institutions and mechanisms to channel inter-state conflicts peacefully. Liberalism conceives of the international system as comprised of institutions and multiple states that generally coexist peacefully. Liberal thinkers believe that the interdependence of states' economies reduces chances of conflict. They assert that economic wellbeing provides contentment to states and they are less prone to enter into a conflict. Liberalism also argues that democracies rarely or do not go to war with one another. Furthermore, states are not threatened by other states' success; they rely on the stability and wellbeing of other states (Baylis and Smith, 2005; Pante and Risne, 2007 cited in Dunne and Smith).

The beliefs of liberal thinkers are not appropriate for this research. Their utopian views do not reflect the current international system. The United States seeks to maintain its global hegemony. As a result, it conflicts with China, a country that is oceans apart and has little to no direct engagement with the United States. Even so, the United States fears a potential loss of its hegemony and tries to contain China. The arguments about economic interdependence and peaceful growth do not hold in our case studies as we can observe empirically that the United States is worried by China's growth. As for the international institutions and organisms, the world has had several institutions that have failed badly, such as the League of Nations, which collapsed with the Second World War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a security organization forged to check the Soviet Union and not to maintain peace. Thus the idea of international organizations is not pertinent. Another point to be noted is that China is not a democracy, but an authoritarian, one-party state, whereas the United States is a democracy. Thus the notion of democracies not going to war is irrelevant. Last but not the least, the sudden mammoth growth of China is a significant cause of concern for the United States and appears to be the chief reason for the US to forge an alliance with India.

Taking the above notions in mind, one of the main arguments of this thesis is

that the United States fears losing its hegemony in the face of China's ascension, and therefore, from a balance-of-power perspective, forges an alliance with India. On the other hand, I argue that China tries to revoke the United States' intent of stopping it from gaining regional and global domination and thus allies with Pakistan to contain India in the region and counter the United States' move. These arguments are realist. The United States and China have been conflicting indirectly. China and the United States' allies in the Asian region have conflicts over several issues, such as the South China sea, the territorial conflict between China and India, China's unofficial backing up of North Korea, China's opposition to the United States in the United Nations Security Council, including regarding the recent Syrian conflict.

Neoliberalism, a more recent trend within liberalism, offers a little more promise than classical liberalism. Like realism, it considers that anarchy is the chief component of the international system but it sees it differently. Neoliberal thinkers see anarchy as an absence of a supranational government in the international system whereas neorealists see it as a plight for security. Joseph M. Grieco argues that neoliberals do not comprehend the graveness and importance of preoccupation of states' survival in anarchy, which stimulates states behavior. Both sides agree on the possibility of international cooperation but neorealists state that it is difficult to accomplish, even more difficult to sustain and unlikely to succeed (Grieco, 1988). Also it is more dependent on state power than neoliberals argue. In our case studies, however, conflict supersedes the chances of cooperation between the United States and China as well as China and India. There is therefore little chance of cooperation, as put forward by neoliberalism.

For instance, India and China are members of international organizations in which they face off. For example, India and China are founding members of the group of global emerging economies Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) (Koba, 2011). Bilateral trade between China and India stood at roughly USD 70 billion in 2014, which is not a lot given the size of the trillion-dollar economies of India and China (Krishnan, 2014). The boundary conflict between New Delhi and Beijing and search for regional/global dominance has soured bilateral relations and hindered the possibility of bigger cooperation. On the other hand the conflict between India and China has also affected the proper functioning of BRICS. China and India both wanted to hold the presidency of the BRICS New Development Bank and the project was stalled due to this dispute. The presidency finally went to China. China and India fought

a war in 1962 over their boundary, in which India lost. Hundreds of other clashes between Chinese and Indian military forces show that conflict supersedes the possibility of cooperation between India and China (Orbat, 2001).

In a similar vein, India and Pakistan have been rival ever since the independence of India and the creation of Pakistan. The possibility of cooperation is even more unlikely between these two neighbors. Bilateral trade between India and Pakistan stood at a mere USD 2.6 billion in 2012-13 (EconomicTimes, 2014). Four full-fledged war and thousands of border incursions and cease-fire violations leave little chance to cooperation. India and Pakistan are members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). But this has not prevented the conflict from enduring with no chance of significant cooperation in sight. In this case the importance of security surpasses that of cooperation (Goraya, Jabeen and Mazhar, 2011).

This is a crucial point. Neoliberals and neorealists give importance to both national security and economic wellbeing but they disagree on their relative prominence. Neoliberals tend to argue that international cooperation is attainable in terms of economic affairs rather than security matters. Meanwhile, neorealists focus on national security and survival issues (Baldwin, 1993). Robert Powell tried to construct a model to unite the neoliberals' emphasis on political economy and neorealists' emphasis on national security. This model shows the possibility of a world where states are trying to maximize their economic wellbeing and military force (Powell cited in Jervis, 1999). While both economic and security concerns are important in our case studies, the latter appear to be more salient, which is why neorealism is more useful than neoliberalism to explain the US and China's interests in forging alliances with India and Pakistan respectively.

In particular, we will see in the coming chapters that both states have tried to maximize their power because power maximization ensures their security and survival or power brings other values that they need. India, China and Pakistan increase their military expenditure annually hinting at the fact that all three nations think of the possibility of a war and thus keep increasing their military might to win over their opponent. Over the past few years India has considerably increased its military expenditure from USD 10 billion in 1995 to USD 40 billion in 2015 (Wolf Jr., 2000; Choudhury, 2015). This represents one third of that of its mighty opponent, China, but is much higher than that of Pakistan, which had a military expenditure of USD 5 billion in 2014 (Miglani, 2014). China tops the list of the three nations with a military

expenditure of USD 132 billion (Wong, 2014). The gradual increase in the military expenditure of the nuclear-powered neighbors shows that international cooperation is unlikely in such a situation.

For all these reasons, we can conclusively say that realism is the most appropriate theoretical paradigm on which we can build the theoretical framework for this thesis. While two more recent trends of realism and liberalism, namely neorealism and neoliberalism, tend to converge on some issues, including the possibility of cooperation, they differ on various key aspects. According to neorealism, in particular, cooperation is tough to achieve; relative gains are a major hindrance to international cooperation, and explain states' competitive behavior (Grieco, 1988). This is consistent with empirical reality whereby cooperation does exist between the countries at stake, but is hard to implement (Steger and Roy, 2010). We will therefore use realism to build our theoretical framework and turn to two particular theoretical perspectives within realism: neorealism and neoclassical realism. We now turn to neorealism.

Neorealism

Neorealism is useful to understand states behavior in relation to balance of power and balance of threats. In this section, we describe balance-of-power theory and balance-of-threat theory. We argue that balance-of-power theory can better explain the interests of the United States and China in allying respectively with India and Pakistan since 2000.

Security has been one of the most important issues in international politics (Rudolph, 2003). Neorealism has long been considered as one of the principal branches of international relations theories to explain security issues. About security, Waltz mentions that, "the state, amongst states, conducts its affairs in the shadow of violence. Because some states may use force at any time, all must be prepared to do" (Waltz, 1979: 102). Neorealists assume that the nature of international politics is anarchic. States will try to acquire and enhance their military capacity to achieve security and protect themselves (Mearsheimer, 2010).

Neorealism is commonly known as 'structural realism', in so far as it explains the structure of the international system. It emphasizes the occurrence of anarchy in the international system, which signifies the absence of a central order. Neorealism also contains some structural characteristics, such as inter-state competition and power

distribution, which are primarily used to speculate causal patterns in the states' behavior (Crawford, 2000).

According to T.V. Paul, international relations theories and regional order are very much intertwined. Each one of the prominent theoretical paradigms of International Relations has something to say about the regional order and conflicts. For instance, realism and its distinct branches – classical, structural, offensive and neoclassical – all have pertinence when it comes to comprehending regional order. Assuming the anarchic character of the global system and its extension in the regional subset, balance of power is the paramount source of regional order in realism. For realists, if there is a proper balance of power or equilibrium in the distribution of power among the leading nations in a region, the existence of an aggressive state is highly unlikely. It is especially true in the case of neorealism. According to neorealism, bipolarity at a global level enhances regional peace whereas multipolarity signifies disorder and disruption of peace. This logic of balance-of-power is based on the hypothesis that two states or an allied group of states are unlikely to go to war if there is a uniformity and similarity in the power of the given states (Paul, 2012). Pakistan, being the weaker actor in the conflict over the Kashmir region, needs to correct such an imbalance. The structure of the regional system in South Asia has constrained the choices available to India and Pakistan in their relations with each other as well as their relations with external actors.

According to neorealism, the primary motive of all states is to amass power. Any cooperation between states is only temporary and is often based on the need to forge an alliance against a common rival. This view predicts interminable conflicts for the foreseeable future. It also explains the actions of a few countries and/or leaders who have shown excessive power drives. At times, when a leading power behaves in a hostile and unreliable manner, its adversaries are perplexed. The target states take this action as if they are intentionally challenged by it and are bound to respond in a hostile manner. Having said that, the challenged states hold their response until they have completely understood why the aggressive state felt compelled to exhibit the threat (May, Rosecrance and Steiner, 2010). This analysis could be applied to our study as the United States see China as a threat in the coming future and must be prepared for any conflict. The cooperation between the United States and China thus could be considered as temporary, or up to that point when there is an absolute threat from one to another. China's provocative behavior in the South China Sea since the last decade proves this,

as it defied United States allies in the region to show its flexed wings waiting for a response (Xu, 2014; 02, 2015, interview). The 2014 mid-air barrel roll by Chinese fighter jet over a U.S. plane near Hainan islands is another example of China's assertion on the United States (Riva, 2014).

Today global dynamics, like the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece, can be understood in (neo) realist terms. Thucydides explained that the Spartans attacked Athens because of their fear of the growing power of the Athenians, as a large chunk of Greece was already under their administration. The shift in power should have caused war, but Athenians did not want this. They had been peaceful for over a decade, and their power grew because they allied with Corcyra, which happened due to Corinthian pressure on Corcyra. Sparta tried to avoid this alliance. Sparta's national interest was survival like all states in realism, and the changing distribution of power posed a direct threat to its existence. Thus, Sparta was compelled to go to war in order not to get subdued by Athens. Spartans acted in a realist way against Athenians' power (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001).

History reveals that balance of power works in two different ways. In the first case, some of the states balance in terms of power that they have. And in other cases, states behave in a more assertive fashion, that is, more than their actual strength would allow. The behavior of China towards the United States is an example of the second case. Such states behave in a showy way by exhibiting their strength and power. Many significant events in global history have taken place because of states demonstrating their power in a superfluous or an ineffectual way. When China and the United States are placed side by side, the results are almost impossible to anticipate and also we cannot be sure that these will continue in the future. Thus, the United States and/or China may or may not show their power in the future (May, Rosecrance and Steiner, 2010). Likewise, several advocates of neorealism maintain that states sometimes act in a weird way, which contravenes the pre-established concept of power between them. For example, while countries with less power sometimes are arduous and contentious, countries that possess more power sometimes avoid behaving in a threatening way. Various historians and analysts thus believe that different states assert their power in different ways (Rosecrance, 2010).

(Neo) realism maintains that all states attempt to pursue power and try to acquire it as much as they can. Accordingly, the only way in which we can restrain the advancing impetus of the dominant states is to create a "balance of power" against them.

Nations who feel vulnerable forge alliances or strengthen their military in order to protect themselves. These alliances with other states are not perpetual, as states do not have permanent allies, only permanent interests. Offensive realism asserts that major powers should look for regional hegemony and also, if they can, world hegemony. Otherwise they will be surpassed by other states. China and the United States might thus enter in a conflict. As Chinese power rises, it will attempt to dominate Asia and the United States, being a hegemon, cannot sit idle and do nothing as China starts to gain prominence and imperil the United States hegemonic position at a global level. Correspondingly, the United States is likely to curb the Chinese growth by forming alliances with other dominant powers in the Asia-Pacific region, such as India, Japan, South Korea and Australia (Zartman, 2009).

All major powers, according to realism, must rely on self-help for survival. They try to expand their power against other rival states. However, at times, they may seek to accomplish ultimate power without taking into account other powers in the periphery. States, which attempt to boost their power, unwittingly make other states feel apprehensive and vulnerable, which in turn will prompt these states to adopt necessary measures to reinforce their survival tactics. Waltz asserts that major powers behave in a combative manner and their possible victims will attempt to balance against the assailant so that they can stop the threat and ensure their survival (Waltz, 1979). The anarchical nature of the international system induces states to act in a protective manner so that they can defend themselves (Steiner, 2010). Both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons since the 1990s and they have not embarked on a new war with one another ever since (Rosecrance and Steiner, 2010).

States have different balancing options in a multipolar world. Neorealism argues that in a bipolar world states tend to balance internally, i.e. they develop their own economic and military powers. Meanwhile, in a multipolar world major states form alliance with other powers and thus balance externally. Furthermore, possessing nuclear weapons gives states the ability to balance against other major powers (Waltz, 1993). This may explain why India and Pakistan have been more self-sufficient since they acquired nuclear weapons. The anarchical system of the international arena implies that the fundamental objective of states is to uphold their own security, and using power to achieve that objective is one the options applied by the states. This also makes the states concerned about the relative power of others in the order. And the different operations performed by the states to maintain their security and pertinent position in the order

result in the establishment of balances of power. In the overall existence of states, we can see the propensity to form balances of power in the international system (Bendel, 1994).

Mortan Kaplan highlights the importance of balance of power theory in neorealism, and emphasizes a number of benefits in comparison to other theories. In particular, balance of power increments the possibility of negotiations instead of war, and balance of power opposes any single actor who attempts to assume position of predominance over the system (Kaplan, 2005). The crucial role of the balance of power in maintaining peace has also been acknowledged by a number of realists, such as George Kennan, former US ambassador to the Soviet Union who advocated the policy of containment, and Henry Kissinger, a former secretary of state to the US President Richard Nixon (Mingst, 2004).

States tend to balance in order to enhance their relative power against their rivals for pursuing security under anarchy. States have two different options of balancing to change their power against their rivals: negative and positive balancing. Negative balancing refers to the use of strategic or diplomatic ties, to undermine a rival state. Positive balancing refers to enhancing one's military power and forming alliances. Balancing is a strategy pursued by states to change their material and non-material abilities in order to use them against a rival (He, 2012).

Kenneth Waltz states that balance-of-power theory "accounts for the recurrent formation of balances of power in world politics, and tells us how changing power configurations affect patterns of alignment and conflict in world politics" (Waltz cited in Keohane, 1986). According to another author, Inis Claude, the balance of power can be categorized into three different forms. They are: balance of power as a 'situation', balance of power as a 'system' and balance of power as a 'policy'. As a system, balance of power refers to the equilibrium of power among states or groups of states. As a policy, it refers to states trying to form or sustain this equilibrium. And finally, balance of power as a situation points out to a definite agreement of the functioning of international relations comprised of several states (Claude, 1962). Another fundamental idea of the balance-of-power theory is that states do not act to form the balance. Instead the balance occurs because states want to ensure their survival in the anarchical system of international politics (Jervis, 1978).

After the culmination of the Cold War, relationships among the United States, China, Pakistan and India changed drastically. A new and asymmetric quadrilateral

composition emerged, which is presently influenced by the United States with China trying to affect the power balance in its favor. India and China are growing rapidly in terms of economy and military power, which makes them strong regional powers that could challenge the world hegemony of the United States. The expeditious surge of China in relation to the United States brings the rise of India in the context of the United States and China as an important one. Taking into consideration that the United States wishes to seek balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, the alliance with India that will be the object of this study makes sense to counterbalance China's compelling ascent. Meanwhile, China's alliance with Pakistan can be explained from the same theoretical perspective as an endeavor to balance India. Balance-of-power theory is thus relevant for this study, as will be seen in the analysis developed in the two following chapters.

Balance of Power versus Balance of Threat

Not all neorealists, however, agree with balance of power theory. Stephen M. Walt, for instance, has argued that the balance of threat matters more than the balance of power. Accordingly, states usually behave in such a way as to balance the greatest possible threats against their security. He sets forth four attributes with which a state can threaten other states. They are: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and offensive intentions. States that are closer pose a greater threat than those that are far away. States who have more offensive military capabilities are more dangerous than other states whose armed forces largely serve to defend their own territories. Finally, states with apparent aggressive intentions tend to generate more opposition than those who seek primarily to uphold the status quo (Walt, 2010).

The balance-of-threat theory also suggests that states form alliances to prevent stronger powers from dominating them and to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources pose a threat to national independence. This could explain, for example, the Sino-Pakistan coalition during the Cold War in order to contain a possible domination by the Soviet Union and India. As a result of India's relationship with the Soviet Union, China developed a strategic relationship with India's adversary, Pakistan, to effectively balance India's threat. According to balance-of-threat theory, what brings together Pakistan and China is therefore not India's pervasiveness, but India's might, coupled with its geographic proximity, offensive

power and aggressive intentions, which poses a threat to both China and Pakistan (Watson, 2001).

Additionally, the balance-of-threat theory helps us understand why there has been relatively little overt balancing against the United States since the end of the Cold War, despite the considerable imbalance of power in its favor. We have to take into account that the United States is very distant to other major powers and its rivals and so cannot threaten their sovereignty in a meaningful way. Also, many other major powers are preoccupied with the regional threat they encounter and they see the United States power as a way to balance these local threats. Also the United States has targeted unpopular dictatorships and regimes, such as Serbia, Iraq, and North Korea (Walt, 2010). However, while this theory brings useful insights into understanding the interests of China in allying with Pakistan, it does not provide adequate explanations for the interests of the United States in allying with India, since the United States is geographically distant from India and Pakistan and cannot engage directly in a meaningful way. As a result, in this thesis we will discard this theoretical perspective and use balance-of-power theory, which helps us understand the key interests of the United States in allying with India and those of China in allying with Pakistan since 2000.

State Interests according to Neoclassical Realism

Gideon Rose coined the term “neoclassical realism” in his book *Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy*. Neoclassical realism is a blend of classical realism and neorealism, put forth most prominently by authors like Wohlforth, Rose, Zakaria and Schweller. It incorporates domestic factors and takes into consideration agency as well as systemic factors in foreign policy analysis. Neoclassical realists assume that the states’ actions are largely based on the likeliness of aggression from another state. Neoclassical realism emphasizes power as the ultimate goal of a state. As a result, neoclassical realists analyze both long-and short-term strategies of states. They also maintain that a state can acquire power from non-traditional sources, such as technology and geography, and soft power, such as food, music, cinema etc. (Brooks, 1997: 462).

Neoclassical realism is well suited to explain the foreign policy of the United States and China, as it takes into account the long-and short-term strategies of states, as well as other factors, which may influence a state apart from military power.

Neoclassical realists believe in everything propounded by the neorealists, adding just an extra set of intermediary variables between systemic pressure and state action. Wohlforth asserts that neoclassical realism “seeks to recapture the grounding in the gritty details of foreign policy that marked classical realism, while also benefiting from the rigorous theorizing that typified neorealism” (Wohlforth 2008: 35). In particular, neoclassical realists argue that a state’s foreign policy is driven, in part, by its relative power capabilities in the international system, and includes other concerns, such as the fight against terrorism. This approach therefore complements neorealism and allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the interests of the United States and China in allying with India and Pakistan respectively.

The study of foreign policy has taken a sharp turn upwards since the end of the Cold War. Kenneth Waltz defines foreign policy as the distinct behavior of states and their interaction with each other in a system (Waltz, 1996). Foreign policy analysis attempts to make certain assertions about the behavior of states (Elman, 1996). A number of factors at the national and international level act individually and together to form and influence a state’s foreign policy. From a neoclassical realist perspective, systemic issues are partly responsible for states’ behavior. Indeed, states’ reaction depends on the possible occurrence of a conflict with another state. Security is the chief consideration, and therefore the states’ military should always be prepared even at the cost of economic capability. Domestic factors can also influence foreign policy. However, domestic factors are not a catalyst for the use of military force in an external situation.

According to neoclassical realism, foreign policy can be explained as “an array of actions taken and strategies pursued by a given state towards other external states or actors in the system which directly or indirectly are in relation to it” (Zakaria 1998: 482). As a consequence, foreign policy analysis could be explained as the query of the reasons due to which a state takes action, defines that action, takes decision on how to proceed with that action, and its repercussions. Taking the concept of power, neoclassical realists assert that systemic constraints mold and shape a state’s behavior because “the most powerful generalizable characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative position in the international system” (Zakaria 1998: 482).

Neoclassical realism maintains that the actions of the states can be explained in terms of systemic variable, like neorealism, while agreeing with classical realism. It believes in the systemic variables, such as the power distribution between states and the

approach of one state towards another regarding their intentions. Neoclassical realism believes strongly in balance of power and further adds that states' leaders tend to misjudge and go wrong while perceiving other states.

Neoclassical realist foreign policy considers that all states seek self-preservation. And material power is the most important factor, over time, with regards to the opportunity and influence that states have. States also have other preferences, which may be dissimilar to those of other states. Alternatively, capacities would only be considered as an instrument of self-preservation and, once achieved, relative gains would be futile. In the anarchic world, relative material capability is considered as the most valuable asset to exert influence over other states. It is crucial for attaining self-preservation as well as a degree of opportunity, which is pursued by the states in enforcing external preferences. We should note that all of the four actors in this investigation are nuclear powered and seek to boost their nuclear power. The distribution of capabilities is a vital component of the system structure (Telbami, 2002).

Neoclassical realist foreign policy also maintains that states' interests tend to augment as they gain more power. As states garner more power, they are likely to pursue other interests that were on hold, owing to their earlier capacity. States misinterpret power at times (Tucker, 1971). Here we can take the case of the four wars between India and Pakistan between 1948 and 1999. All four wars were initiated by Pakistan but won by India. The states' desire to obtain security is a crucial component in understanding foreign policy. Additionally, relative power is an important factor in policymaking. States pursue power. However not all the states do so in a same fashion. We can take the example of the different military expenditures of the four states considered in this research. The United States is the biggest spender, followed by China, then India and lastly Pakistan (Hashim, 2014).

Neoclassical realism was born with "the rigor and theoretical insights of the neorealism of Waltz, Gilpin, and others without sacrificing the practical insights about foreign policy and the complexity of statecraft found in the classical realism of Morgenthau, Kissinger, Wolfers, and others" (Taliaferro, 2009: 4). From this standpoint, after the end of the Cold War, the United States faced no threat from Europe. As a result, it redirected its foreign policy towards Asia and the Greater Middle East, where it aimed to avoid or hinder that a possible new rival would gain enough "resources" to dominate a region (US Department of Defense, 1992). This move can be seen as crucial for United States to check or slow down new emerging powers, such as

China. From the neoclassical perspective we can then see how by controlling the resources from mineral-rich countries of Asia and the Middle East, the United States aims at controlling China's economy and thus its overall economic and military rise before it becomes a veritable threat. As China continues to look all over the globe, including Africa and Latin America, for resources to boost its economy and military, the United States seeks to maintain control over these territories to check Chinese growth (Foulon, 2012).

According to neoclassical realism, foreign policy works at both domestic and international levels. The addition of domestic-level variables means that analyzing foreign policy with neoclassical realism is more accurate and far-reaching (Putnam, 1988). Domestic factors, like political beliefs and national character, are very much responsible for a country's behavior beyond its boundaries. To comprehend why a country is behaving in such a manner, one should look deeply and analyze domestic actors and factors. Several authors maintain the suitability of neoclassical realism in so far as "by taking into account both the domestic and international constraints on the state, and by articulating both the domestic and international choices available to the state, we are able to provide a more comprehensive, integrated approach to the analysis of state behavior" (Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry, 1989: 471).

Such an analysis can be applied to the US, China, India and Pakistan. For example, India's relationship with Pakistan worsens whenever the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) the Hindu nationalist party, comes to power as opposed to the Universal Progressive Alliance's (UPA), probably because of the sensitive and insensible remarks by Hindu leaders against Pakistan and its leaders and vice versa. Several other more delicate matters, such as remarks over the Kashmir issue, also sour the relationship between India and Pakistan.

Further, the difference between state power and national power is important for analyzing foreign policy. State power roughly refers to a state's capability to use its natural, military and economic resources to solidify its position, whereas national power could be understood as a state's position in the international arena. Thus, neoclassical realism provides a more complex and deeper understanding of state behavior in the international realm. The ambition of a state's foreign policy is compelled most importantly by the country's place in the global system (Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry, 1989).

Kenneth Waltz himself acknowledged that the global system is difficult to

comprehend without the help of its domestic counterpart (Waltz, 1959). Another neoclassical realist, Randall Schweller, talks of states and their incentives. He argues that states tend to cover up and misstate sensitive information about their capabilities, so as to be shielded from external threats and rivals (Schweller cited in Payne, 2007). This applies to China, which is believed to hide the extent of its military expenditure amount just as Israel denies having any nuclear weapons.

Neoclassical realists also assert the occurrence of cause and processes by virtue of which states enhance their influence in international politics. As their power increases, states are likely to look for influence in the external world (Onea, 2012). With China flexing its muscles, it has started to seek influence in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean area, which has alarmed several of its neighboring countries, including the Philippines, Japan, South Korea and India (Ramzy, 2014).

Additionally, neoclassical realists claim that relative material power is responsible for setting up the elementary framework of a nation's foreign policy. They agree with Thucydides saying of "the strong to what they can and the weak suffer what they must". One of the main ideas of neoclassical realism is that states reply to the uncertainties of international anarchy by trying to control and carve their external environment. The security policies of each state differ from another. For example, a very strong state has a different policy from a very weak one (Mandelbaum, 1998). As the states keep on moving from one level to another, their foreign policies follow suit. Paul Kennedy argued that, "there is a very clear connection in the long run between an individual great power's economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important military power (or world empire)" (Kennedy, 1989).

Taking the example of China and India, being two of the biggest economies of the world, both have strong militaries and a sizeable military expenditure, which has considerably increased since the past decade. According to Robert Gilpin, "[a] more wealthy and more powerful state [...] will select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state" (Gilpin, 1981). Here we can look at the United States. Being the world superpower, it spends over \$610 billion dollars in military expenditure, much more than poor nations, such as say Sudan or Sri Lanka (Peterson Foundation, 2015).

According to neoclassical realism, states give priority to short-term relative gains over long-term gains because of the presence of uncertainties in the international system like anarchy and power struggle. States act rationally, pursuing and

safeguarding their national interests. They are devoid of external agency and cannot neglect the rationale of anarchy in the global arena that bounds them to disregard the standards of morale and pursue the required options for survival (Hobson, 2000).

States feel insecure. According to the self-help idea of neorealism, states themselves can guarantee their survival, which constrains them to acquire ‘capabilities’ to survive. The capability of a sovereign state is defined by five different abilities. They are demographic power, military power, economic power, its natural resources and finally its technological capacities. States’ interests mainly consist of enhancing their capabilities to multiply their chance of survival. These comprise of boundary, military and economic security. A nation’s interests are compelled by its degree of capability (Telhami, 2003). Possessing sovereignty over the entire land and water mass makes a state’s interests. Securing its boundaries from intrusion from other countries and maintaining the integrity of the country is one of the chief interests of sovereign nations.

The fundamental objective of the states is survival on which the accomplishments of all other objectives rely. Survival is also understood by the broader term of “security”, which is the chief interest of states according to neorealism (Guzinni, 1998). The interests of the states keep on expanding as their relative power rises. We can take the example of the United States, which was a superpower of the World War II. After the war, its interests expanded, including taking significant responsibilities, such as to curtail the growth of communism, promote democracy, maintain peace, etc. It behaved like that because it possessed the capability to do so, and the United States saw this as a matter of national security (Jakobsen, 2013).

Neoclassical realism dictates that the appearance of threats at the systemic and regional levels combined with the relative distribution of power drives the security and foreign policies of powerful states (Taliaferro, n.d.). It puts emphasis on power deriving it from the three basic principles of realist theory. They are: (i) survival for individual can only be ensured if alliance is made with external powers, (ii) international politics is a nation’s game of struggle for power and security in a world of insufficient resources, and (iii) international politics is basically fed by the relative distribution of power (DiCicco and Levy, 1999).

Neoclassical realists define “national interests based upon their subjective assessments and perceptions of the international distribution of power and other states’ intentions, but always subject to domestic constraints” (Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, 2009:35). According to neoclassical realists, states’ behavior is uncertain, which makes

it tough to predict a possible threat. Even though the foreign policy administrator receives information about threat perception from certified sources, it is still hard for him to shift opportunities, policies, and distribution of power (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, 2009). We will now turn to the US and China foreign policies to see how these elements play out. We will begin with a review of the literature on the US and China foreign policies in general in the last section of this chapter, before moving to our concrete case studies in the following chapters.

US and China Foreign Policies

Much has been written on the US and China foreign policies in the academic literature. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States came out as the winner of the Cold War and as the only superpower in the world, making it unipolar. Later, the United States acquired a security-oriented foreign policy in order to maintain its safety, which was reflected in its attempt to contain communism around the world for its own security, national integrity and ideology. Subsequently, after the 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States continued with a security-oriented approach to enhance and maintain its security (Russell, 2006). Its constant interest in countries, such as Venezuela and North Korea, shows that security is the top most priority on its agenda.

China, on the other hand, has acquired a security-oriented approach after its rise as a superpower. It started challenging the US hegemony with its ever increasing military power and engaged in conflict with the allies of the United States. China de-escalated the conflict with the United States and its allies during the government of Deng, who thought that China should gain economic and military leverage before challenging other powerful adversaries. China has now become the biggest economy on the planet in terms of purchasing power parity, leaving behind the United States. China is now somewhat face to face with the United States even though it has a long way to go to outrun the United States (Kelly, 2007). We will now turn to an examination of the foreign policies of both states in turn.

US Foreign Policy

As of 2015, the United States government had diplomatic relations with almost all nations of the world. The foreign policy of the United States has been devised to achieve different goals. Some of them are to ensure the United States security and defense as

well as safeguard the United States national interests at home and around the globe. National interests carve foreign policy and encompass a wide range of topics such as economic, military, political and humanitarian (CRF, 2015).

The foreign policy of the United States has changed over time but the United States is still pursuing its national interests. After it got independence from the UK, its chief national interest was to maintain its sovereignty, keep its independence and check other powerful European nations from colonizing it. Under the Monroe doctrine, its prime national interest was to stop European nations from further colonizing the American continent. After the end of World War II it came out as the most powerful economy on the planet. It helped in devising the United Nations, creating alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and helping poor European democracies that had been devastated by World War II. Then came the period of the Cold War and United States foreign policy shifted to the sole containment of the Soviet Union, which also led to two deadly wars in Korea and Vietnam respectively. The United States and the Soviet Union competed with each other on several levels including economic, military and ideology. After the Cold War the Soviet Union was weak and disintegrated, leaving the United States as the undoubted superpower of the world (Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000).

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, various factors drove the United States foreign policy, including: maintaining its global hegemonic power, promoting the spread of globalization with the help of different liberal economic institutions, fostering the idea of Western-style democracy, use of military power to solve humanitarian crises, providing aids and supporting humanitarian missions, secluding and sanctioning wretched states who were threatening world peace and stability etc. (Samuel, 1999).

Climate change and threat of nuclear terrorism also appeared on the agenda of the United States foreign policy at the end of Cold War. The Gulf War of 1999 was an important foreign policy issue for the United States, which helped Kuwait in pushing back Iraqi forces. The United States created military alliances with many countries by the end of the 1990s, and established military outpost in several of them in Europe and Asia. It concentrated its foreign policy geographically into four different regions after the Cold War: The Greater Middle East, including Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan; Latin

America including Cuba; Africa suffering from radical Islamic terrorism; and, finally, the ascent of China and the pivot toward the Asia-Pacific (Cox and Stokes, 2012).

The United States foreign policy took a major turn after the terrorist attacks of 2001. The attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC brought an end to the decade-old foreign policy of the United States. It made the United States realize that its geographical distance and possession of missiles could not keep it safe in the face of the new threat that had surfaced: transnational terrorism, a byproduct of globalization. The terrorists used civilian aircrafts as missiles and killed nearly 3000 people in the heart of the United States, which set forth a new era of violence and conflict (Haass, 2002).

After the 2001 attacks the foreign policy of the United States took a shift and focused on the ‘War on Terrorism’, which included a ground and air military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also brought drastic changes in prisoners’ treatment law and several other domestic laws (Fraser, 2002). One of the planners of the United States foreign policy, Richard Haass, asserted that Pakistan was a key player in helping eradicate terrorist activities that were brewing on its land, mainly by Al Qaeda and the Taliban. He argued that the Pakistani government agreed to the United States intervention and believed that terrorists were plotting plans to disrupt the world peace (Haass cited in Suri, 2009). Yet, in the face of uneven cooperation by Pakistan, the US soon turned to India as its key ally in the fight against terrorism, as well be discussed in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, the security of Europe remained a chief foreign policy concern for the United States. NATO became a powerful entity to safeguard the security and integrity of European counterparts. Founded for the sole reason of containing the Soviet Union, its goal remained to strengthen Western Europe in the face of a powerful adversary on the East, the Soviet Union, and helping to pursue the interests of the United States (Sloan, 2011). The happenings in Ukraine soured the relationship between the United States and Russia. After the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the United States imposed sanctions against Russia to prevent it from trying to exert aggression on former Soviet countries. Moreover, this case revealed the need for United States to protect its hegemony as the world superpower from rising threats and emerging powers, such as Brazil, China, India and Russia (Holloway, 2006).

China Foreign Policy

Like the US foreign policy, during the last few decades the foreign policy of China progressed in an irregular fashion. The leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping had a significant impact on China's foreign policy. During the Cold War China was torn in between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity under Mao's leadership. In the era of Deng, the foreign policy of China became more inclined toward the idea of peaceful development and modernization in the new political, economic and international order (Cheng and Zhang, 1999). The government of Deng Xiaoping lasted until 1992. During that period China had several interests and goals, including economic reforms and development, getting recognized by other countries and opening up to them, national reunification, attaining global and regional security, and establishing a new economic and political order in the country. Its foreign policy therefore focused on keeping a peaceful international environment without conflicts to acquire the modernization goals, and establishing a new political and economic order. After the Taiwan Strait crisis of the 1990s, China established strategic partnerships with several powerful nations. It signed a partnership deal with Russia in 1996 and a similar deal a year later with France. This showed China's eagerness to build up confidence with the world's major powers and continue developing its economy (Guanxi and Jiemian, 1997; Quansheng, 1996; He, 2012, 2015).

After the end of the Cold War, China shifted its focus onto the United States, which resulted the only superpower afterwards. The United States and its other Western allies had imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions against China as a result of the events of the Tiananmen Square in 1989 generating grave problems. Although the United States and China tried to maintain a peaceful relationship following the Cold War, they are far away from establishing a strategic relationship based on mutual trust. Some scholars even assert that a military conflict between the United States and China cannot be avoided, as both countries have different ideologies and interests. Goldstein argues that the Chinese had anticipated that the United States would be the sole superpower of the planet for many decades before the world became multipolar again and that the United States would possess the power to thwart them in achieving their interests (Goldstein, 2005).

China also probably realized that, even with its increasing military power, it would take years for it to reach the military level of the United States and its allies. In addition, it reacted to the stance of various countries that had begun to take actions to protect themselves from possible aggressions by China, such as various states in South East Asia. This made Beijing preoccupied that the United States would try to contain it by forging alliances with nations of the region. The United States support for Taiwan also meant that China would have to engage in a military conflict with the United States if it were to reclaim the island (Goldstein, 2005).

After the culmination of the Cold War, China also encountered different diplomatic crises, such as the Taiwan Strait crisis, the bombing incident of the Chinese embassy by the NATO military forces in Belgrade, and the Hainan Island incident in which a United States Navy aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter jet in flight. The crises with Japan and Philippines also triggered a response from China. In many of these situations the Chinese government escalated the situation, yet in others it tried to deescalate the situation and bring it back to normal. China's behavior depended on three factors, namely the graveness of the situation, internal authority and international influence. For example, in the cases involving the United States, China usually escalated the situation given the competitive nature of the relationship between the two countries (Lanteigne, 2009; 03, 2015, interview).

Conclusions

This chapter has set the theoretical framework for this thesis. A realist approach, based on balance-of-power theory and neoclassical realism, was selected as the main theoretical perspective for analyzing the interests of the United States and China in allying respectively with India and Pakistan since 2000. Balance-of-power theory was considered crucial to explaining the interest of the US in balancing China and the interest of China in balancing India and the US, which are key to explain both alliances. Neoclassical realism offers additional insights into the interests of the United States in allying with India and China with Pakistan since 2000 since it sheds light on other important interests for the US and China to engage in these alliances, including the fight against terrorism. In the last section, I reviewed the foreign policies of the United States and China in light of the academic literature so as to better understand the interests of the two countries in allying with India and Pakistan respectively, and frame the analysis

that will be conducted in the following chapters. The next chapter will analyze in depth the chief interests of the United States in allying with India since 2000.

CHAPTER III

THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN ALLYING WITH INDIA SINCE 2000

This empirical chapter analyzes the three main interests of the United States in allying with India since 2000. These include maintaining its economic power, containing China in order to preserve its hegemony, and combating terrorism with the help of India. From the end of the Cold War, and in particular from the early years of the new century, the United States foreign policy gradually shifted, tilting toward India and away from Pakistan. Another important turning point was the September 11 attacks, which changed the course of history and made the United States rethink and reevaluate its foreign policy. India thus became an important strategic ally to the United States, and the United States has developed crucial interest in allying with India, as will be discussed in detail in this chapter.

The onset of the Cold War just after India's independence nudged India to side with the Soviet Union. At the same time the United States decided to support Pakistan and China, India's two adversaries. But the beginning of the 20th century distanced New Delhi and the successor of the Soviet Union, while the United States reframed its foreign policy in relation to the new international system. The George H.W. Bush administration took into account that India and Washington had the same interests, such as promoting democracy and countering radical Islamic forces. The first U.S. support for India in the dispute over Kashmir during the Clinton administration in the 1990s was during the Kargil war between India and Pakistan. At the time, Clinton ruled out the possibility of a future alignment of the United States with Pakistan in regional disputes. The Bush administration also accused Islamabad of cross-border terrorism. Pakistan later promised to look into the matter. The Bush administration finally put an end to the historical favoritism toward Pakistan and drew closer to New Delhi. Meanwhile, the alliance of the United States with India compelled China and Pakistan to come closer as they pursued similar interests, like containing India and exerting sovereignty over the disputed states of Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh, both administered by India (Mohan, 2006). We will discuss this parallel trend in the following chapter, which focuses on China's interests in allying with Pakistan since 2000.

The interests of the United States in the Indian subcontinent are essential and expanding. These include; i) avoidance of a major war between the two rivals India and

Pakistan, ii) impediment of further nuclear proliferation, iii) enhancing economic growth, trade and investments, iv) encouraging sturdy democratic organizations, and v) seeking cooperation on issues such as strengthening stability across Asia, combating and coping up with terrorism and drug trafficking and maintaining bilateral relationship with New Delhi (Rose, 1997). A more recent and essential interest surfaced after China began to acquire significant power and the United States realized that it could lose its world hegemony gained after the fall of Berlin Wall. The United States had to contain China, and India was a key ally in this regard.

Maintaining its Economic Power

In 2014, China surpassed the United States and became the world's largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. The United States has many economic interests in forging an alliance with India. India is the biggest arms importer in the world and was close to becoming the biggest arms importer of the United States as of 2015. In 2013, India imported almost USD 2 billion worth of arms from the United States. This number kept on soaring as India's military expenditure rose (Bender and Gould, 2015). India's relationship with Russia deteriorated gradually as Russia improved its relationship with China, and India's long time rival, Pakistan (The Economist, 2015). The purchase of Russian weapons by China and Pakistan generated a grave situation. Since India is in conflict with both aforementioned countries and if India has the same weapons as China and Pakistan, it loses an important edge during a war. As a result, India looked for an arsenal change, which could be provided by the United States and its allies, such as Israel, France and the United Kingdom. In 2014, the United States surpassed Moscow to be the biggest arms supplier to India (Lakshmi, 2014; Pandit, 2014; Variyar, 2014). India also sought to prepare itself in front of the Chinese and Pakistani army, which supposedly have a better arsenal. The United States eagerly accepted this shift, as it enabled it to fulfill its economic interest, in so far as India's military imports generate billions of dollars for the US companies. This has helped the United States to maintain its economic power (Plimmer and Mallet, 2014; Sivaraman and Rajagopalan, 2014; Hardy, 2014).

India's military spending increased by 75% over the past few years, reaching USD 40 billion in 2015 (Shah, 2013; Behera, 2015). Researchers say that increased military expenditure does not indicate a possibility of war. However, with the

intensified military might of China, India has become anxious, and the United States has taken advantage of the anticipated 'China threat' to increase weapons sales to India help in its economic growth.

Another significant economic interest for the United States to ally with India is that of capital from overseas Indian students. In 2014, there were over 100,000 students from different cities of India studying in the United States bringing over USD 5 billion to the United States economy in tuition and living expenses. An estimated 15% of all the foreign students in the United States were from India (Ruiz, 2014). The Indian diaspora in the United States stands at nearly 4 million people, and was the second largest after the Chinese one as of 2014 (Batalova and Zong, 2015). The United States therefore has an interest in improving its relations with India in order to obtain huge economic profits from Indian expatriates to the US.

Furthermore, the bilateral trade between the United States and India stood at roughly USD 100 billion in 2013, representing a growth over a 1000% from the end of the Cold War. Major export items from India to the US include precious stones and metals, textiles, pharmaceuticals, and machinery. Major export goods from the US to India include precious stones and metals, machinery, mineral fuel, optical instruments, and aircraft parts. Foreign direct investment between the two countries stood at USD 24 billion in 2014 and the United States was the sixth largest investor in India (Meltzer, 2014). The burgeoning bilateral trade between the United States is a major sign of the strengthening of relations between the United States and India. The United States government reportedly aims at increasing the bilateral trade to USD 500 billion by 2024, which will represent a five-time increase from USD 97 billion in 2013 (Akhtar, 2014). This significant increase in trade and foreign direct investment flows hints that India is on the verge of becoming an important trade partner for the United States. Owing to its enormous population, India has a large consumer market. Additionally, the rapid westernization of India has increased the demand for US imports. All these factors are important for the United States, which is interested in maintaining and increasing its economic power.

India and the United States also share cooperation on issues, such as space cooperation, science and technology, and health. In space cooperation the National Aeronautics Space Association (NASA) and Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) exchange scientists and programs. The 2014 Indian Mars mission orbiter used parts from its US counterpart NASA. An Indo-US science and technology joint

commission was established in 2005, and many bilateral workshops and research centers were created between the two countries. The US National Institute of Health and Indian Council of Medical Research work together to combat and research on various diseases. This additional factor may also explain US interest in improving its relationship with India (Embassy of India, 2015).

On January 26, 2015, Barack Obama became the first president of the United States to attend the Republic Day event in India. Ahead of the occasion, Lisa Curtis, a Heritage Foundation scholar and former CIA analyst said “Aside from the symbolism and optics of being the first US President to serve as chief guest at the Republic Day celebration, Obama has a real chance to cement ties with India in a way that supports US goals with the Asia pivot” (Curtis in Rajghatta, 2014). This was in fact the second visit of President Obama to India. No other president in the history of the United States had visited India twice. He had already visited India in 2010 to talk about economic and security matters (The Telegraph, 2010).

Reciprocally, in 2014, Narendra Modi visited the United States after he won the 2014 general elections and became the Prime Minister of India. We should note that Narendra Modi was the chief minister of the Indian state of Gujarat for over a decade before becoming the Prime Minister, and his entry visa to the United States had been revoked following the 2002 communal riots in which hundreds of Hindus and Muslims perished, which occurred in Godhra, Gujarat. The United States stated that Modi had violated severe human rights during the riots and he could not enter the American soil. His visa was revoked from 2005 till he became the Prime Minister of India in May 2014. At the time a special statement was issued by the United States saying that Modi was welcome in the US and he could visit whenever he so pleased (Barry, 2014). Modi gave a speech in New York at the Madison Square Garden, which was jam packed with over 19,000 people. Barack Obama and Narendra Modi jointly wrote an article titled “A Renewed US-India partnership for the 21st Century” in the Washington Post. In this article, they discussed the shared values and interests of the United States and India. They mentioned the names of visionaries and leaders from the United States and India, such as Swami Vivekananda, Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr. and their teachings to the world. They also stated that the partnership and cooperation between India and the US was stronger than ever and increasing constantly. Barack Obama and Narendra Modi finally stated, “Still, the true potential of our friendship has yet to be fully realized” (Obama and Modi, 2014). The United States sudden change of mind

with regard to Modi seemingly shows its significant interest in improving relations with India.

Furthermore, Barack Obama wrote a profile for his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi in the influential TIME magazine, titled “Narendra Modi: India’s Reformer in Chief”. In it, Obama praised the Indian Prime Minister, writing how he became the prime minister of the world’s most populated democracy from being a mere tea seller (Obama, 2015). The 2014 visit of the US senator John McCain to India to meet with the Indian minister of Foreign Affairs Sushma Swaraj to enhance the strategic ties between the United States and India is another proof of enhanced bilateral relationships. Senator McCain said “We seek to take our strategic partnership with India to the next level, it is important for US leaders to reach out personally to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, especially in light of recent history” (PTI, 2014). These events illustrate the deepening and improving ties between the United States and India, which ultimately shows the interests of the United States in allying with India, and one of the chief interests of the United States behind this is to maintain its economic power. Yet, there are other key interests, such as containing China, as will be discussed below.

Containment of China

India and China have maintained boundary disputes over the McMahon line and the region of Aksai Chin. Further, India’s increasing military capacity could lead to a military face-off between India and China some time in the future (Rao, 2009). The United States has taken advantage of this situation to seek an alliance with India to jointly counterweigh China’s expansive military power. Hence India and the United States have engaged many times in recent years to enhance India’s ballistic missile defense (Srivastava, 2009). The United States willingness to help India strengthen its military might since the beginning of the new century hints that it needs India in the Asia-Pacific region to contain China (Chansoria, 2010).

The United States and China initially sought to balance India and Pakistan against each other for their own national interests. The balance of power between India and Pakistan tilted towards India, which made the conflict between the two states asymmetrical. The United States and China helped Pakistan to overcome this asymmetry for many years, yet the foreign policy of the United States changed drastically, first, after the Cold War and, later, at the beginning of the new century,

especially after the September 11 attacks. Now the United States favors India more than Pakistan, which has led to an increase of the asymmetrical character of the conflict. A milestone in this new approach of the United States toward India was the 2005 nuclear deal. The United States signed a deal for providing India with cutting-edge nuclear technology and other resources to meet India's growing energy needs, knowing that India was not a party to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Joshi, 2013). Historically the United States had nagged India to accede to the NPT, and India's reluctance to do so had soured the bilateral relationships. The United States decision to bury up the hatchet and improve its relations with India seems to have no other explanation than the US interest to contain China (Choudhary, 2008).

The US interest to contain China in the face of its rise as a global power has had an influence on India and Pakistan, which play crucial strategic roles. During the 1990s, the United States and China had been involved in a strategic relationship for ensuring the accession of India and Pakistan to the NPT and the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), as both of the nuclear-powered nations had not signed either of the treaties. But, gradually, the United States changed its foreign policy and applied a multi-centered Asia approach. The signing of the NPT was therefore supplanted by a push towards greater military and economic cooperation with India. Such a shift is another illustration of the United States' desire to contain China and its balance-of-power approach to achieve that goal (Detlef, 2012).

The United States' interest in counterbalancing China came to the fore under the administration of Bill Clinton. Since then the United States has increased its trade and military ties with India (Bajoria and Pan, 2010). As mentioned by the then Secretary of State William Burns: "Never has there been a moment when India and America mattered more to one another. And never has there been a moment when partnership between India and the United States mattered more to the rest of the globe" (Burns cited in Hussain, 2011).

India's strategic importance makes it a key ally for the United States to achieve a balance-of-power strategy in Asia. According to Reuters, the United States should vigil the New Delhi-Beijing relationship at a close distance and should include this into its strategic policies for the Asia-Pacific region (Reuters cited in Curtis, 2011). It is in the United States interests to assist India, as a strong India could suppress China on its own. As early as 2008, the United States provided India with state-of-the-art nuclear technology, seeing it as a likely ally against emerging China and global terrorism

(Rajagopalan, 1999). Mearsheimer asserted that most of Beijing's neighbors, such as India, Japan and South Korea, could form an alliance together with the United States to contain China (Mearsheimer, 2006). China's increasing military power, in consonance with balance-of-power theory, would therefore thrust many countries in Asia, including India, towards Washington, which is largely beneficial for the United States long-term interest in containing China.

In addition to containing China, the United States pursues security interests in the region. In particular, it has tried to maintain peace between the nuclear-powered states of India, Pakistan and China, since the conflicts between India and Pakistan and between India and China affect the region as well as the world. For example, after India and Pakistan became nuclear equipped in 1998, both came to the brink of war. The last such incident occurred in 2001 after the attacks on Indian parliament and Indian army camp. India held responsible Pakistan for both the attacks and pledged to respond with vengeance. Both India and Pakistan moved a large chunk of their army near the international border. The United States implemented a two-faced strategy to avoid a war. It applied pressure on Pakistan to end its aid for the terrorists in Kashmir and simultaneously on India to pay attention to the upcoming legislative assembly elections in Kashmir. A nuclear war would have devastated the two growing economies and turned them into failed states (Winner and Yoshihara, 2002). The United States also suffers from a series of threats derived from the India-Pakistan conflict, such as arms race, drug trade, and, most important of all, terrorism. While the US interest in curbing terrorism will be analyzed in the following section, it is important to mention here that peace in the region would not only serve the US security interests but it would also serve as a counterbalance to China's growing power (Glardon, 2005).

The US has increased its military ties with India steadily. Now the militaries of India and the United States perform joint naval and air exercises in the Indian Ocean region. The navies of the United States, Japan and India conducted a trilateral naval exercise in the northern Pacific in 2014. The prime ministers of Japan and India said that these kinds of exercises would continue to increase over the years (Panda, 2014). The United States military also helped its Indian counterpart extensively during the 2004-05 tsunami of the Indian Ocean, which killed thousand of people and left millions without shelter (Cohen, 2008). Additionally, it provided India with loans on solar equipment for its growing energy needs. (Kugelman and Vickery, 2014).

While the United States military supremacy and preponderance is well established, new and emerging trends in the international political economy tilt towards the economic development of China. The overall course therefore points towards China as an emerging power militarily and economically, whereas the United States tries to retain power inside the global arena. China, in particular, started to increase rapidly its military expenditure with regards to the United States. In the face of this situation, the United States has formed alliances with other major powers of Asia, such as Japan, India, South Korea and other concerned South East Asian nations like Philippines and Indonesia, to countervail and outweigh China's thriving military might (Ikenberry, 2008).

In addition, the asymmetry between the four countries that are the focus of this research makes China, Pakistan and India all interested in their relation with the United States, which is the only superpower between them, possessing a much higher economic and military power than China, India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan have sought an alliance with the United States. Likewise, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies maintains that, "both India and China take their ties with the United States as one of the most important relations in external affairs" (Zongyi, 2010). Both China and the United States appear to maintain good bilateral relations at the international level. Nevertheless, the United States ties with India are much closer than the Sino-US relationship, considering the balance-of-power strategy of the United States in the region (Zongyi, 2010).

As part of its China containment program, the United States has been pushing for an enhanced cooperation between the US, India and Japan. The United States welcomed the India-Japan strategic partnership announced in 2014 and stated that it looked forward to strengthening its cooperation with both countries. In a statement, the US State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki declared that, "the US strongly supports India's collaboration and cooperation with its neighbors in the Asia Pacific. We actively support such collaboration through our trilateral dialogue and other activities with India and Japan, and look forward to strengthening further our trilateral cooperation. As we have long said, a strong, prosperous India contributes to regional and global peace and prosperity." (Psaki cited in PTI, 2014). Tokyo has long been an important strategic and military partner of the United States and it supports the United States in its pivot to Asia in order to isolate and contain China (Jayasekera and Jones, 2014).

As the then President of the United States, George W. Bush, said during a

speech, the relationship between the United States and India has “never been better”. According to him, India’s religious pluralism and secular government make India “a natural ally of the United States” (Pan, 2006). In the next section we will look at a third key interest of the United States in allying with India: curbing terrorism.

Combating Terrorism

During the era of the Cold War the United States foreign policy was designed in such a way that Washington could manage its relationship with both Pakistan and India without creating a dilemma. This unnatural balancing proved difficult at times as it is not easy to be friends with two states who are rivals. During the Cold War the United States inclined more towards Pakistan. In 1954 for instance, Pakistan was considered the ‘most allied ally in Asia’ of the United States, according to the then chief of army staff of Pakistan (Khan cited in Khan, 2011).

After the Cold War military-to-military contacts began to increase between the United States and India for mutual interests. Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), the Hindu Nationalist Party came to power in 1998 and changed its strategic relations with the United States and its allies (particularly Israel). Thus the relationship between New Delhi and Washington became stronger. As a result in the Kargil war of 1999 between India and Pakistan the then president of the United States took India’s side by declaring that Pakistani forces had illegally intruded in Indian territory. It was the first time in recent history that the United States had acknowledged that Pakistan was at error (Chaudhari, 2011). In the words of Stephen Cohen, Indians were dumbfounded by United States support (Cohen cited in Chaudhari, 2011).

The worsening relation between the United States and Pakistan could also be explained by the fact that Osama Bin Laden was found and killed in a raid by the US military in Pakistan, which brought into question if Pakistan was proving refuge to America’s biggest enemy. The Pakistani army was uninformed about the raid and was considered as helpless and useless against foreign intrusions (Qazi, 2014). The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, once said that. “Gone are the days when our national security policies were determined through telephone calls from abroad. We now have a democratically elected government, chosen by the people of Pakistan.” He claimed that the United States drone attacks were a gross violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty (PTI, 2014). These happenings reveal that the relationship between

Pakistan and the United States has changed with the two countries every time further apart.

Since the entrance of the United States in Afghanistan in 2001, several US military and intelligence operations have decisively shown that the Pakistani military, government and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) have been working against America's interest in the region. Hussain Haqqani, the then ambassador to the United States even said that, "it would be better for Pakistan and the US to accept that their interests as currently defined do not converge and the alliance is over" (Haqqani cited in Carter, 2013).

This considerable change appeared after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks on three prestigious hotels and a railway station, a UNESCO world heritage site in which many foreign tourists as well as Indians lost their lives. The alleged involvement of Pakistan in supporting terrorist groups or at least tolerating them on its territory in the region and at the global level distanced the United States from Pakistan. One of the attackers of 2008 Mumbai terror attacks caught alive was later found out to be a Pakistani national. He confessed that he had been trained in Pakistan with the help of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence and the terror attack mastermind 'Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi'. These incidents made the United States change its strategic policies towards Pakistan and try instead to improve its relationship with India (Rotella, 2015).

The United States and India have reached several agreements to curb terrorism at the regional level as well as at the global level. India and the United States share bilateral counterterrorism partnerships via several training and joint working programs. The India-US strategic cooperation on curbing terrorism started shortly after the end of the Cold War. It gained momentum when the then president of the United States, Bill Clinton, visited India in the year 2000 for the first time, after over twenty years that a US president had not set foot on Indian soil. After India tested nuclear devices in 1998, the United States applied sanctions on India, which were finally lifted by the end of the century by President Clinton. After the visit, the United States-India relationship maintained a steady pace. The 9/11 terrorist attacks further solidified the U.S.-India relationship. The deadly terrorist attacks at the Indian parliament in December 2001 revealed that the United States and India confronted a similar threat. This has given fruit to strategic cooperation between the United States and India to fight against terrorism (Embassy of the United States, s/f).

Many experts believe that the 2000 visit of President Clinton was an unofficial recognition of India as a powerful nuclear state and that this status could not be reverted back. After the events of September 11 2001, the United States and India enhanced their military ties and engaged in high-level policy dialogue, military-to-military exchanges and other joint activities. Ministers from both the countries started their official visits with several important topics on the agenda including terrorism and shared military intelligence (Tomar, 2002).

Curbing terrorism is of utmost priority on the US-India agenda. A few years back when the relationship was gaining momentum, the United States in a statement made to the press said, “It is important for Pakistan to stop the groups that carry out terrorism in India” (PTI, 2009). Since president Clinton, all US presidents have visited India at least once, which shows the increasing importance of India for the United States. President Obama referred to the US partnership with India as “one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, one which will be vital to US strategic interests in Asia-Pacific and across the globe” (US State Department, 2014).

According to a 2014 United States State Department report, India is one of the countries most incessantly targeted by terrorism. The report said that India suffered from attacks by transnational terrorist and insurgent groups. The report states that over 400 people lost their lives due to terrorist attacks in India in 2013. Accordingly, “The Government of India deepened counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States, highlighted by a September 30 Summit between President Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, where both sides pledged greater cooperation in countering terrorist networks and in information sharing” (US State Department cited in Mahapatra, 2015).

Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said at a press conference in 2013 that the United States and India were working closely together for curbing terrorism. She also said, “There is no justification of taking innocent lives. India and the United States share a common goal of curbing terrorism” Rice, 2013). She also suggested that Pakistan should do more to stop terrorism that stemmed from its soil (Rice, 2013). The United States also signed a counter terrorism agreement with India in 2009 to curb terrorism jointly. Such an agreement contemplated extended cooperation between the United States and India to combat terrorism. India and the United States agreed to share information regarding terrorism, such as counterfeit currency and financing of terrorism, as well as information on maritime and border security (Embassy of India, 2015).

The United States considers India as a key player in South Asia against terrorism and radical Islamic forces. After the terror attacks on the Indian parliament in December 2001, India and Pakistan came to the brink of nuclear war. The US played a key role in easing the tension, and India agreed on having bilateral talks with Pakistan provided that Islamabad stopped funding terrorists across the border (Hadar, 2003). The United States once again acknowledged Pakistan's hand in terrorism. The Pentagon in a report in 2014 said that "Afghan and India focused militants continue to operate from Pakistan territory to the detriment of Afghan and regional stability. Pakistan uses these proxy forces to hedge against the loss of influence in Afghanistan and to counter India's superior military" (TNN, 2014). Such an acknowledgement is key in explaining the US growing interest in allying with India.

After the terror attacks of France in January 2015, the US Secretary of State John Kerry remarked that India and the United States had greater responsibilities, such as to maintain peace and democracy in the world. He stated, "We will together fight against all acts of extremism and will never allow it to succeed in any part of the world" (Kerry cited in Dasgupta, 2015). Ahead of the Obama's second visit to India in January, the US State Department warned Pakistan to ascertain that there would be no terrorist incident from Pakistan's side and, if any such occurrence happened, then it should be ready for severe repercussions. The warning was issued keeping in mind the terrorist attacks of 2000 when the then president of the United States, Bill Clinton, visited India and a terrorist attack left over 35 people dead in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, an indirect hint by Pakistan to the US that Jammu and Kashmir was still a loose end (Khaama Press, 2015; FirstPost, 2015).

Terrorism has become a significant threat to international security. With its global approach and presence, this menace should be addressed by using transnational solutions. The heart wrenching events of 9/11 and 2008 Mumbai terror attacks in the United States and India respectively showed the lagging security issues in both countries. The United States helped its Indian counterpart to deal with the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. This attack broke down many hindrances regarding the United States-India counterterrorism programs as six US nationals had died in the attacks (Sharma, 2012).

The United States and India are also part of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which is a new multilateral forum with other countries such as Russia, and the European Union. This is an initiative brought forward by the US president Barack Obama to deal

with growing terrorism (Zhang and Zhao, 2011). Recent events also showed the growing pressure from the United States administration on Pakistan to stop terrorism now. In 2015, during a meeting between the US president Obama and the Pakistani president Nawaz Sharif, Obama essentially blamed Pakistan of disseminating terrorism. Sharif brought up the drone strikes issue and pleaded Obama to stop the strikes and that Pakistan was all up for curbing terrorism with the United States. Obama bluntly ignored the appeal citing that Pakistan is a terrorism-exporting country, and the drone strikes were a legitimate US response in areas where Islamabad had no control and had ceded sovereignty. It was in part also because of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks whose main culprit, Lakhvi, was released recently and roams free in Pakistan (Rajghatta, 2013).

Terrorism as a major security threat brought together the national security interests of both the United States and India. And, after the September 11 attacks the United States came to understand the extent of terrorism threat. The United States views its war on terror with respect to immediate threats that put into jeopardy its national security from different menaces such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism at a global level, and finally the reason that stimulates terrorism the most, religious fanaticism. All these issues are at rise in South Asia, which makes it a direct interest of the United States, as terrorism is a major threat to the United States. Thus the United States has sought to steadily push Pakistan to bring changes in its policies and establish a proper functioning democracy without the control of the military (Lal and Rajagopalan, 2004).

Conclusions

Currently both the United States and India are relishing good rapport, which reflects a metamorphosis in the relationship maintained by the two countries. In the past this relationship was characterized by doubtfulness and skepticism. This dramatic change occurred after the culmination of the Cold War and became particularly significant following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. Former President of the United States George Bush once said, “India and the United States are separated by half a globe. Yet, today our two nations are closer than ever before” (Bush cited in Roberts, 2005).

With the end of the Cold War the US started to see India as an ally (Ganguly and Kapur, 2007). The United States has had three chief interests in allying with India: to contain the rise of China, to maintain its economic power with growing trade from

India in weapons sale and other exports, and to curb terrorism. The partnership with India against terrorism has been of special interest to the United States, especially after 9/11. As India also suffers severely from terrorism, the US and India interests match in this aspect. In the next chapter we will discuss the interests of China in allying with Pakistan since 2000.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERESTS OF CHINA IN ALLYING WITH PAKISTAN SINCE 2000

China has been one of the longest and only allies of Pakistan in the region. Their relationship blossomed on a shared interest, animosity towards India. Pakistan was the first Islamic country in the world to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) diplomatically in the 1950s (Fravel, 2002). China shares a long border with Pakistan. India fought its first war with Pakistan in 1948 losing a large part of its territory. After that, China and India went to war in 1962 in which India was defeated callously. Subsequently, China and Pakistan decided to mend their boundary differences to face a common enemy, India. They resolved their border disputes and started to concentrate on enhancing their partnership. Ever since then, Pakistan and China have been strong allies. They both share cooperation in several important fields, such as economic, military, and nuclear ones. In fact, today China is Pakistan's only discernible ally. This makes India grunt. Pakistan is a key strategic player in the Indian subcontinent for China's rise and to pursue its strategic national interests.

As seen in the previous chapter, from the years 2000 the United States gradually shifted alliances, abandoning Pakistan and strengthening ties with India. The 2005 India-US nuclear contributed in furthering China's alliance with Pakistan. China is prudently using Pakistan to pursue its national interests, which include being the regional leader as well as marching rapidly to become the global leader surpassing the United States. That is why it is important for China to save itself from the encirclement that the United States and India are putting her into. Here Pakistan comes into play as its boundaries give China access to the greater Middle East for trade and commerce. Likewise, China's relationship with Pakistan prevents India from domineering the Indian subcontinent and keeps India occupied as both China and Pakistan have a conflict with India: Pakistan regarding the Kashmir region and China regarding Kashmir and Indian administered northeast region. In this chapter we will discuss the two primal interests of China in allying with Pakistan since the year 2000. They are: containing India and the United States from checking its rise, and being the regional leader. In the next pages we will see how China has maneuvered Pakistan to pursue its national interests.

Containing India, the United States and its Allies

China has had a phenomenal rise economically and militarily in the past few decades. It has become the world's number one economy in terms of purchasing power parity. It is the world's second largest military spender and the third largest country on the planet in terms of land area. China is also the world's most populous country, and the world's largest importer and exporter of goods. Finally, as of 2014, it had the biggest standing army on the planet (Kataria and Naveed, 2014).

These factors make China a powerful country, so powerful that lately it has been challenging the world hegemon, the United States. Many Western policymakers have started worrying about China's perceived aggression in the East and South China seas against United States allies. They consider China as a rival superpower that challenges the United States. According to them, China is creating a "great wall of sand" in the South and East China Sea area, claiming all the disputed maritime territory as its own. Several other countries also claim the disputed South China Sea territory, including Philippines and Vietnam, which are US allies. The United States and its allies have come to worry that China might use its military prowess to grab more territory as it has been constructing infrastructures and runways to get supplies in the area. That is why the United States has shown a special interest in the region as China's action could destabilize the area (Griffin, 2015).

The official visit counts between leaders of China and Pakistan tells the story of how close China and Pakistan are. There have been hundreds of official visits between the two countries including between presidents, prime ministers, defense officials, and others. Recently, in 2015, the Chinese head of state, Xi Jinping, visited Pakistan for the very first time. Eight fighter jets from the Pakistani air force escorted his official plane 'Air Force One' over the Pakistani airspace in a theatrical style to give him extra security and a special welcome (Lu, 2015). This was reciprocated well by Jinping, who wrote an article for the Pakistan's Daily Times titled "Long Live the Pakistan-China Friendship". In this article, he expressed how China felt about Pakistan: "When I was young, I heard many touching stories about Pakistan and the friendship between our two countries. To name just a few, I learned that the Pakistani people were working hard to build their beautiful country, and that Pakistan opened an air corridor for China to reach out to the world and supported China in restoring its lawful seat in the United Nations. The stories have left me with a deep impression. I look forward to my

upcoming state visit to Pakistan” (Jinping cited in Panda, 2015).

Several analysts believe that a conflict between China and the United States is inevitable, and both the countries should be prepared for such a situation while trying to remain calm. In August 2014, a Chinese fighter jet and a US military surveillance plane came face to face in the South China Sea, which significantly increased tensions between the two countries (Valencia, 2014). China’s woeful relationship with Japan, another sworn ally of the United States, also makes things difficult. China’s unhealthy relationship with its biggest neighbor and another regional power, India, also benefits the United States. The United States has taken into account the huge potential of China and started taking measures so as to ensure its global hegemony and keep China in check (Tellis and Mirski, 2013).

In the face of such a situation China has had to strengthen its relation with Pakistan to balance India and the United States. “Indo-US restoration, re-balancing and re-counterbalancing strategies are mainly driven by bilateral strategic partnerships based on “engagement and resistance” (Nadkarni, 2010: 123). In this context, the China-Pakistan relationship has been revived by Beijing and Islamabad to set up a counterbalance against the United States and India in the Asia-Pacific. As the United States support for India is a cause of concern for both Islamabad and Beijing because the United States is producing a new asymmetry between India, on one hand, and China and Pakistan, on the other hand. Because of this new strategic imbalance China has supported Pakistan more than ever on political, diplomatic and military issues. For example, after the 9/11 events, China was the only strong country in the world that supported Pakistan, which opposed the United States intruding to Pakistan and carry out a stealth operation, which is a major territorial breach of a sovereign country. Additionally, China also broke its NPT pledge and provided Islamabad with sensitive nuclear technology and equipment (Jahangir, 2013; Rousseau, 2014).

China is threatened by the India-US encirclement, which in turn hampers the Chinese relationship with both India and the United States. Accordingly, China and Pakistan are working together in invigorating their alliance so as to counterweigh the India-US alliance against them (Merrington, 2012). On the India-US and China-Pakistan relationship, Markey states “This (strategic) quadrangle could stretch towards two poles, with the United States and India gravitating towards one end and China and Pakistan towards the other, leaving these two sets of players diametrically opposed” (Markey, Haenle and Saalman, 2011).

China and India have long been rivals on several grounds. The first dispute could be dated back to the year when China annexed Tibet in the 1950s saying that Tibet was originally part of the ancient Chinese empire. While, India did not protest against the annexation even though it had to share thousands of kilometers of new boundary with China, it gave asylum to the Tibetan leader Dalai Lama and several other Tibetan refugees in 1959 after an uprising in Tibet, which soured the relationship with its neighbor. The Dalai Lama to date lives in India and is a major cause of ire in the bilateral relationship between China and India. Owing to this reason and various others, India and China fought a war in 1962, which was won by China. After the war, India lost a sizable amount of its land to the People's Republic of China. The following year China resolved its boundary dispute with Pakistan. Several analysts claim that the resolution of the conflict between China and Pakistan was aimed at establishing a common front against India (Chatterjee, 2011).

After the war, China set to improve its bilateral relationship with Pakistan at a steady pace. It started providing Pakistan with political, economic, military and even nuclear support. China's highly globalized economy and its dependence on the Middle Eastern oil has increased the importance of South Asian nations. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives and Myanmar, in particular, are of great importance to China because of their geographical location. They are imperative for China's energy security, and establishing strong relationships with them is a way to contain India (Delvoie, 2015).

China also fears that the United States and India are trying to contain it with the help of numerous allies of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region (Small, 2015). Small (2015: 32) believes that Pakistan plays a significant role in the advancement of China's interests and will certainly be a useful asset in "China's transition from a regional power to a global one." China's significant military and economic support to Pakistan has forced India to devote important resources in its conflict with Pakistan and hindered its rise as a powerful opponent (Small, 2015). South Asian specialists Elizabeth G. M. Parker and Teresita C. Schaffer on this matter assert that "Beijing clearly sought to build up Pakistan to keep India off balance" (Parker and Schaffer, 2008: 3).

China did not help Pakistan militarily in its 1965, 1971 and 1999 wars with India, but it did help Pakistan to be self-sufficient by providing it with the technology of a nuclear bomb and nuclear energy, and offered its support to Pakistan in international arenas when it so needed. For example, in 2015 China used its veto in the

UN Security Council to support Pakistan. Pakistan had released the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks mastermind Lakhvi, India requested the United Nations Security Council to take action, but China prevented this from happening by using its veto (Parashar, 2015). The main reason behind China's support to Pakistan is that a weaker India because of Pakistani intrusions will be easier for China to handle, as India's most powerful ally, the United States, is not nearby for immediate help (Rippa, 2015).

Increased US presence in the Asia-Pacific has alarmed China, as it has began thinking that the United States will do anything to maintain its hegemony. Other causes for concern include the United States' warming relationship with India, the rising Indian economy, and India's already significant manpower. In addition, as of 2014 India was the world's largest arms exporter as well as the third largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity and has the third largest army too (China Briefing, 2014).

In the recent years, China-Pakistan alliance has reached greater heights probably because of the India's extending leverage and the heightened presence of the United States in Asia in general (Kumar, 2006). Since India tested nuclear weapons in 1974, which was seen by China and Pakistan as a threat against them, China and Pakistan have strengthened their relationship to face a common enemy. That is why China provides Pakistan with military support and equipment in the India-Pakistan conflict. It also gave Pakistan cutting-edge nuclear technology and ultimately helped it to build its own nuclear weapons in 1998 in the face of India's nuclear threat. China also helped Pakistan extensively to reinforce its military supplies over the last decades so as to give Pakistan an upper hand in an otherwise asymmetrical India-Pakistan conflict (Rahman, 2007; 01, 2015, interview).

According to China, after India tested its first nuclear weapons in 1974, the stability of the Indian subcontinent was disrupted. China issued an official statement to the press stating that "India's explosions have sabotaged the fragile trust built up with Beijing over the past decade" (Rahman, 2007: 215). The India-China relationship was deeply destroyed. China imposed economic sanctions on India. In fact many analysts believe that this was another turning point in the China-Pakistan relations. It gained a huge momentum after the explosions. In fact it was China that gave Pakistan the green light to go nuclear in order to be safe from its biggest rival, India. China provided Pakistan with the technology and support to conduct its own nuclear tests for containing India and restoring the balance of South Asia (Rahman, 2007).

The matter of nuclear proliferation is an important one between the United

States, China, India and Pakistan. Pakistan acquired and signed nuclear deals with its foremost ally, China. The asymmetry in the India-Pakistan conflict necessitated India to ally with the United States and China with Pakistan. India's consistent military growth has preoccupied China and made it strengthen its relationship with Pakistan to contain India (Feigenbaum, 2010). In the year 2003, China held a joint military exercise in the East China Sea with Pakistan, demonstrating its military interest in allying with Pakistan to contain India (Mitchell and Bajpae, 2007).

According to neorealism, states do not have permanent friends; they have permanent national interests. A nation's interest drives the foreign policy of the state. John W. Garver maintains that "China and India are at odds about the political-military regime regulating the Himalayan massif" (Garver, 2002: 384). China has supplied technology, arms, ballistic missiles and nuclear warhead designs, weapons grade uranium, and advanced aircrafts, such as the J-10 fighter planes to Pakistan (Joshi, 2011). Pakistan was the sure candidate for China's ambitions to contain India, as Pakistan and India were already rivals. Besides Pakistan has been a viable ally for China's desire to maintain peripheral stability and befriend other nations in South Asia (Deng and Moore, 2004). Pakistan has supported China's move and actions in the East and South China seas as well as regarding Taiwan and Tibet. Support from a neighboring Asian nation has helped China in pursuit of its national interests (Liping, 2013).

A large chunk of Kashmir is administered by Pakistan with the help of China and a part of Aksai Chin is administered by China. China also claims the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as its territory and names it Southern Tibet. Thus, China has a geopolitical interest in the India-Pakistan conflict, as losing Kashmir for India would mean gaining territories for both China and Pakistan. In this way China could also acquire other territories claimed by it and administered by India. This would be advantageous for both Pakistan and China against India (Oren, 1994).

Map 1. Territories under dispute between China and India as of 2012.



Source: *The Economist*

In order to contain India, China has reached several military and security agreements with Pakistan. China has been providing weapons to the Pakistani army, navy and air force since the startup of their closer relationship in the 1960s. Today, Pakistan has become the biggest importer of Chinese arms. Pakistan has also obtained assistance from China for its civilian and military nuclear programs. In fact, Pakistan bought more than 60% of China’s weapons sale 2010. China’s global arms sale increased a 212% for the period of 2004-2008 and a 6% rise was seen in the period of 2009-2013. Almost 75% of these sales were made to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, countries with which China pursues good relations and/or is trying to improve relations (Wezeman and Wezeman, 2014). In 2008, China and Pakistan engaged in a milestone bilateral dialogue to enhance their military ties (Siddique, 2014).

China has three basic interests in establishing a close relationship with Pakistan: “preserving Pakistan as a viable military competitor to India, using Pakistan as an overland trade and energy corridor, and enlisting Pakistani cooperation in severing links between Uighur separatists in western China and Islamists in Pakistan” (Beckley, 2012: 9). On China’s relationship with Pakistan, Stephen Cohen states that it is a “classic

balance of power” approach to engage Pakistan with India with the possibility of a war between the two (Cohen cited in Beckley, 2011).

In 2010, China declared that it would help Pakistan build two nuclear reactors over the next years. This deal was a violation of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of which China is a member. Being a member of the NSG, China cannot supply nuclear material to any country, although it did so even after it acceded to the NSG in 2004. Andrew Small, a leading analyst of the China-Pakistan relationship from the United States, stated that “in private, Chinese analysts are quite clear that this is a strategic tit-for-tat [in response to US-India nuclear deal] and it's a very worrying portent if this is going to be China's approach to the nonproliferation regime in future” (Small, 2010). This was a move by China to strengthen Pakistan's status in front of India and the United States and sending a message indirectly to both India and the United States that China had a key player to counter their actions in South Asia. Another expert on the topic, Sumit Ganguly from Indiana University argued that China befriended estranged Indian neighbors for its containment: “China has a clear-cut strategy for using its leverage in the region [...] They're going to continue to work with India's neighbors as a strategic hedge against New Delhi, but Pakistan will remain central to this strategy” (Ganguly, 2009).

Being the Regional Leader and Moving towards Global Leadership

China is quickly emerging as a strong economic and military power in the international arena. With constant increasing power, Chinese interests are expanding at both regional and global levels. China aspires to be the hegemon in Asia as well as someday a true global superpower. It has a long way to go to become a superpower, but with the help of its regional allies it might reach that goal. China is the only country in the world, apart from the United States, to have a three-digit military budget. It is almost four times that of India, the other largest military spender of the region. Pakistan has been a natural ally to China over the last five decades, supporting and standing by all of China's needs including its military, political and diplomatic interests. Economic ties between Pakistan and China are burgeoning fast. With the help of Pakistan, its most trusted ally, China is rapidly surfacing as a powerful regional leader (Ebrahim, 2015).

From a balance-of-power perspective, China as a regional power plays a great role in stabilizing and destabilizing the traditional offset of South Asia. India, China

and Pakistan have been nuclear powered since the last century. China is a bigger nuclear power than India or Pakistan, as it possesses a larger arsenal. China acts as a balance for its ally Pakistan and as an imbalance for its adversary India. China has attempted to disrupt the traditional imbalance in the India-Pakistan conflict by supporting Pakistan for its own strategic interests. The foremost interest of China in allying with Pakistan is therefore not only to restrain India's growing military might but also to exert regional dominance (Yuan, 2007).

China and Pakistan recently completed over 60 years of diplomatic relationship and solid ties (Kabraji, 2012). Bilateral trade between Pakistan and China has boomed. Both countries benefit from the trade. In the year 2000, the imports and exports between China and Pakistan stood at roughly USD 1 billion, but in 2013 the trade rose to a whopping USD 13 billion (Kayani, 2013). In 2006, the then president of China praised China-Pakistan ties in a statement. In particular, he highlighted five common goals:

- Deepening strategic cooperation and consolidating traditional friendship,
- Expanding 'win-win' business ties,
- Expanding cultural and social exchanges and strengthening the basis of friendship,
- Strengthening cooperation in international affairs and upholding common interests, and
- Promoting exchanges among civilizations to enhance world harmony (Jian, 2011).

These interests all point towards China's interest to maintain its regional hegemony. The same year, China and Pakistan signed a free trade agreement to enhance their strategic partnership. It is relevant to note that Pakistan is the only country in South Asia with whom China has signed a free trade agreement. As a matter of fact this free trade agreement has been much more advantageous for China than it is for Pakistan as the South Asian country struggles hard in the competitive Chinese markets with its inferior products. On the other hand, Chinese products sell like hot cakes in Pakistani markets (Maken, 2011).

Another one of major economic interests for China in allying with Pakistan is gaining a land route access from Xinjiang to the economies of the greater Middle East through the Gwadar province in Pakistan. This could be seen as another benefit to China. As long as the Pakistani-administered Kashmir region stays disputed and India

is out of it, China can harvest economically. China donated 5180 square kilometers of disputed Kashmir territory to Pakistan for its future use, which it had gained in the 1962 Sino-Indian war (Global Security, 2014).

The Gwadar trade route is extremely beneficial for China, as the eastern route is much more longer and dangerous than the new Gwadar route for China to enter the Gulf states, and other European and African nations. Apart from that, the Eastern route has the United States naval bases. Thus, the Gwadar route in the Arabian Sea port offers China a better, shorter and safer option economically for pursuing its strategic national interests (Siddique, 2014).

In 2013, Pakistan handed over the complete authority of Gwadar port to China. This route opens up new opportunities and markets for the Chinese products and commodities to the rich Gulf countries and beyond. Several Chinese firms have already begun investing in sectors, such as mining, infrastructure, telecommunications, automobiles and engineering to take advantage of the port. This port, situated in the Balochistan province of Pakistan, has huge potential to evolve into one of the most important ports of Asia. The Gwadar port will reportedly generate billions of dollars and will provide jobs to millions of Chinese (Nilofar, Jiang and Ishtiaque, 2014).

Some analysts also believe that China could use the port as one of its naval bases to challenge the US hegemony in the Arabian Sea region. Besides, the port will help China to challenge Indian hegemony in the Indian Ocean region (Delvoie, 2014; Curtis and Scissors, 2012). Husain Haqqani, a scholar at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said in a statement in 2006 about Pakistan's importance for China, "For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India" (Haqqani cited in Misra, 2013: 68). In order to establish a Chinese regional hegemony, it is indispensable for China to contain India and hinder it from pursuing its interests.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was established in 2013 to boost economic ties between the two neighbors. The corridor was proposed by Beijing to begin construction in 2013 (Tiezzi, 2014). The main motive behind the construction of this corridor is to connect the already existing Gwadar port in Pakistan's Balochistan to China's Kashgar and Xinjiang, which will ultimately make Gwadar port ever more important, geographically speaking. The corridor is supposed to be of 2500 kilometers (South China Morning Post, 2014). In 2015, China promised Pakistan an investment of \$46 billion in the CPEC, which will also pass through the disputed Pakistani-administered Kashmir bordering India (The Economic Times, 2015). The CPEC is

China’s attempt to further boost trade with Pakistan and the Gulf countries, including Africa and Europe. Chinese premier Le Keqiang himself emphasized the importance of the CPEC saying that China wanted to rekindle old trade routes that connect China with the rest of the world (Jia, 2014). CPEC is Jinping’s ambition to achieve “one belt, one road” idea to provide connectivity from China to the greater Middle East (Bloomberg, 2015). In November 2014, the current Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif inaugurated a \$300 million project in the hilly areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Xinhua news agency of China stated that it was a groundbreaking move for the CPEC and would effectively divide Pakistan into two, and China would be able to exploit the new route for its strategic interests (Chang, 2014).

Map 2. Pakistan-China economic corridor



Source: Siddique, Mandokhel and Ghaus, 2015.

China has been in positive trade balance with Pakistan since the startup of their friendship in the 1960s. In 2012, Pakistan imported goods and commodities worth USD 12 billion, adding a large sum to the Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Khan, 2013). In this way, China is the one that gets benefitted economically in the China-

Pakistan relationship. Apart from trade and commerce, Pakistan provides China big bucks in weapons purchase. As a matter of fact, Pakistan is China's biggest arms importer accounting for almost 41% of China's all exports in 2013. Recently, Pakistan bought eight submarines from China worth USD 5 billion, as well as 50 fighter jets in 2010 worth USD 1 billion to improve the Pakistani air force in the biggest ever deal by the Islamic republic. It should be taken into account that the fighter jet is also jointly produced by Pakistan and China as their military cooperation (Ebrahim, 2015). Bigger arms sale to Pakistan helps China economically and fulfills another one of its strategic interests that is to contain India in order to prevent it from challenging its regional hegemony. Indeed, if Pakistan were weaker militarily, India might move its forces from the Pakistani border to the Chinese, threatening China (Beckley, 2012).

More generally, China needs to keep India occupied in order to continue with its relentless march to gain hegemony. China uses Pakistan to distract the Indian armed forces as well as strategic concentration away from itself. The China-Pakistan relationship serves both countries. For example, if a full-fledged war breaks out between India and Pakistan or India and China, India will be torn between the two countries, as both are strong opponents. The security tension between India and Pakistan helps China maintain its regional power as the conflict hinders India from acquiring more political and economic power, and thereby challenging China at the regional and even global levels (Curtis and Scissors, 2012).

The alliance with Pakistan has also been useful for China, since Pakistan has supported it politically on many local and international issues, including the Tiananmen massacre that occurred in 1989. Pakistan has also backed China on its stance regarding Tibet and believes in Beijing's "One China" policy (Siddique, 2014). The support from the world's third largest Muslim nation and one of the nuclear powers is important (Chung, 2002).

Both China and Pakistan are highly dependent on energy supplies from oil-rich Muslim countries. As a result, they need to secure the routes through which the oil is imported, which encompass the Indian Ocean. They also have shared strategic interests in acquiring access to the Central Asian energy corridor for their growing energy needs, especially China. In order to do so, China needs Pakistan's help to build confidence with the majority Muslim states of Central Asia (Wirsing, 2003). In order to gain regional hegemony, China also needs to strengthen partnerships and ties with the rest of the South Asian nations. John Garver emphasizes "China efforts to establish and

expand political and security relations with the countries of the South Asia-Indian Ocean region (SA-IOR)” (Garver, 2002: 4-5). Pakistan is a key player in South Asia for China. China has used its relationship with Pakistan to establish and enhance military ties with Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh and is also trying to restore its relationship with Bhutan (Garver, 2002).

For China to become a regional leader, it also has to take part actively in regional forums and groups. Geographically, China is not a part of South Asia. Still it wants to become a member state of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which includes India, Pakistan, Nepal, Maldives, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. In 2006, Pakistan brought China as an observer country in SAARC, while New Delhi responded by bringing Japan, South Korea and the United States as observer countries. Pakistan has also backed up China’s request to become a full member of SAARC. China’s attempts to lure SAARC member countries other than India by offering them huge investment and infrastructure assistance hint at China’s interest in using SAARC as a platform to enhance its regional dominance, for which Pakistan’s alliance is key (Tiezzi, 2014).

Pakistan also acts as a key player in advancing other Chinese interests. In particular, China suffers from insurgent and terrorist attacks in its Western region, and has a great desire to curb terrorism on its soil. In fact, Chinese officials are relating terrorism on Pakistani soil to the emergence and activity of separatist groups in Western China. Chinese officials have therefore gotten in touch with their Pakistani counterparts to seek their assistance in stopping attacks in China’s Western region. With Pakistan’s assistance, for example Chinese leaders have talked to the Taliban in order to prohibit Uighur separatists, who wish to secede from China, from using Afghanistan soil for training purposes (Radin, 2012).

With the NATO forces retreating from Afghanistan in 2015, the United States presence in the region will gradually decrease and generate a power gap in the region. China will be quick to cover that gap in order to gain more regional influence and power. With Pakistan more distant from the United States, China will steadily step in to take advantage of the situation. Beijing will use this opportunity to further enhance its economic and military interests with Islamabad, and gain access to lucrative goods from Afghanistan, notably oil and raw minerals such as copper. The latest visit from the Afghan President to China hints in this direction, which will eventually increase China’s regional prominence (Rakisits, 2015).

Conclusions

In the previous paragraphs we have seen how Pakistan has been a remarkable ally to China and is key for China's pursuit of national strategic interests, not only in South Asia but also at a more global level. Pakistan acts as a strong counterweight to China's rival, India, another Asian giant that could prevent China from pursuing its interests in the Asia-Pacific and gaining regional and global influence. Pakistan's deteriorating relationship with the United States further allows China to strengthen its position in Asia. China has been pouring millions of dollars in the Pakistani economy and military as a stronger Islamabad helps Beijing in stopping its rivals.

Chinese projects in Pakistan are also key for Beijing's overall economic, political and military progress. Pakistan has helped China gaining access to different Muslim countries to satisfy its growing energy needs and support its burgeoning economy. This has also helped China to sell its products to newer and unexplored markets in the greater Middle East. The large military sales to Pakistan also benefit China's economy, and it increases the popularity of Chinese weapons in the global market. Other Islamic countries are thus now turning towards China for trade and commerce along with weapons purchase.

While China's relationship with North Korea is crumbling, Pakistan maybe the only true ally of China in the current global scenario. As put forward by one Chinese expert, "If China decides to develop formal alliances, Pakistan would be the first place we would turn. It may be the only place we could turn" (Dominguez, 2015). Beijing and Islamabad have solidified their six-decade relationship with the 3000 km China-Pakistan economic corridor that puts China back on the center of the world by providing it access to uncharted territories. With the United States-led NATO forces gone from Afghanistan, it would be in China's reach, with Pakistan's help, to attain complete regional hegemony.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has analyzed the interests of the United States and China in allying respectively with India and Pakistan since 2000. In order to do so, it drew on the qualitative analysis of data from different sources, three interviews with experts on the topic from China, the United States and Pakistan, and a critical revision of the literature. The theoretical framework of this thesis was based on realism. Balance-of-power theory was used as a central theoretical approach to understand two main reasons for the United States' alliance with India and the alliance of China with Pakistan: the US interest in balancing China and China's interest in balancing India and the US. Neoclassical realism, a mixture of classical realism and neorealism, complemented the theoretical framework and facilitated the interpretation of other interests of the United States and China behind these alliances.

The major findings of the thesis can be summarized as follows. The United States has had three major interests in allying with India since 2000. The first one is to contain China. China is on the rise to becoming a global superpower. It has shown a prodigious growth and expanded its strategic interests, which has started to worry the United States. Western politicians see China as a powerful rival and a strong challenger to the United States hegemony. In order to preserve its hegemony, the US therefore needs to contain China. It is doing so with the help of its allies in the Asia-Pacific, especially with the help of India, another major Asian giant, which coincidentally is also a rival of China. This interest can be understood from a balance-of-power perspective. Meanwhile, as will be discussed below, China intended to counter this move by forging a stronger alliance with India's foremost adversary, Pakistan, which had already soured its relationship with the United States.

The second major interest of the United States in forging an alliance with India is to maintain its economic power globally. Trade and foreign direct investment have gradually increased between India and the United States in the past years. The United States pivot to Asia is seen as an act to regain its losing shine with the help of its allies across the Atlantic. India is a rising power. Because of its huge consumer market, it has the potential to become a major trading partner of the United States and help it in pursuing its strategic interest of retaining its status as a major economic power. Recent improvements in bilateral relations between the United States and India hint that the United States needs India to maintain its economic prowess. These include the 2005

India-US nuclear deal, increasing trade and foreign investment between the United States and India, as well as multiple state visits from the leaders of both the countries. This interest can largely be understood from a neoclassical realist perspective. It refers to the change in the foreign policy of the United States redirected towards Asia in general in order to curb Chinese growth and maintain its hegemony. As India is a crucial power in Asia, an improved relationship with India gives the US access to Indian allies in the region that are key to containing China.

The third major interest of the United States in allying with India is to curb terrorism stemming from Asia. As India also ails from terrorism, the two countries have a shared strategic interest in eradicating terrorism. The United States and India have reached different agreements for dealing with increasing terrorism, such as sharing information and joint military and naval exercises. This interest is key to the peaceful rise of India and aids the United States in maintaining peace in its territory.

Meanwhile, China's main interests in allying with Pakistan since 2000 are to contain India and its allies, including the United States, and to gain regional as well as global prominence. China's extraordinary rise has alarmed the world hegemon, the United States. China has anticipated a possible encirclement by the US with the assistance of its allies in the Asia-Pacific region, accordingly, it is using its foremost ally, Pakistan, to challenge the measures taken by the United States and India. China has tried to repeal the containment strategy put forth by India and the United States, with the help of Pakistan. India is in conflict with both Pakistan and China. China uses the India-Pakistan conflict in its strategy to contain India. China's support for Pakistan in its conflict with India has kept India militarily occupied and prevented it from challenging China. In addition, should Pakistan get an upper hand in its boundary conflict with India, it would serve China's territorial interests, since China also claims territories administered by India. This interest reflects the balance-of-power approach applied by China with Pakistan to counter the alliance by the United States with India to hinder China's rise.

The second main interest of China in allying with Pakistan is to attain regional hegemony. Pakistan helps China in many ways so that it can reach regional and global domination. For example, big arms sales to Pakistan help China to increase its economic power and advertise Chinese arms in the international market. Likewise, the alliance has enabled China to get acceptance by other Islamic countries, and gain access to the greater Middle East through the China-Pakistan economic corridor. China has invested

billions of dollars in the corridor that will ultimately benefit it in opening new markets for the sale of its products. Furthermore, Pakistan has handed over the Gwadar port to China, which assists China in challenging Indian hegemony in the Indian Ocean and maybe used as a naval base.

The two strategic alliances can therefore be explained mainly in terms of balance of power, since the United States and China are using India and Pakistan respectively for their national interests to contain powerful opponents. The United States has indeed used India to stop China from overtaking its position as the world leader. Meanwhile, China has taken advantage of its alliance with Pakistan to attain regional hegemony and strive towards global hegemony.

In order to explain the interests of the United States and China, I have applied a theoretical framework based on neorealism and neoclassical realism, with an emphasis on balance-of-power theory, to explain the interests of the United States and China in allying respectively with India and Pakistan since 2000. Neoclassical realism was used to include crucial components of classical realism to complement the balance-of-power approach and understand, in particular, the specific security interests of the US and China, including their interest in reducing terrorist threats.

There has not been any war between any of the four countries since the last century, but the situation is such that India and Pakistan, India and China or the United States and China might enter a war, although not a full-scale one. This would have serious repercussions for the region and the world, bringing down markets throughout the world and resulting in huge devastation. This research is therefore important to anticipate such a scenario, as it involves four nuclear powers. It brings great insights to understand the relations between each one of the countries. Further, the fact that the research has been done in Latin America gives it a special significance as Latin America has much to learn about the importance of these two alliances in global politics.

In addition, three of the four countries are largely involved in the Latin American region for trade and commerce. China has become a key financier, trade partner and investor in several Latin American countries, including Ecuador, and India is increasing its presence in Latin America. Meanwhile, the United States has traditionally considered Latin America as its backyard, which makes it interesting, as China's growing presence in Latin America is a direct threat to US hegemony. All in all, it is expected that this thesis will contribute to offering insights into two crucial

alliances that will likely shape the future of Asian politics and, more generally, international politics.

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