El rol de las comisiones permanentes en las legislaturas de América Latina: un test del modelo informativo de éxito legislativo
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Calvo, Ernesto
Sagarzazu, Iñaki
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Quito: CELAEP
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¿Tienen las comisiones permanentes jurisdicciones políticas que son respetadas por el Plenario de la Cámara? ¿Pueden dichas comisiones imponer preferencias que son distintas a las de los votantes medianos de sus Cámaras? Luego de dos décadas de competencia democrática, los investigadores interesados en entender las legislaturas de América Latina tenemos a disposición una gran cantidad de material cuantitativo y cualitativo que nos permite modelar las interacciones entre los miembros individuales, colectivos y las instituciones legislativas que regulan el tratamiento y sanción de proyectos de ley. En este artículo nos enfocamos en un problema que ha recibido muy poca atención en la literatura legislativa de América Latina: la relación que existe entre las preferencias de los miembros de las comisiones permanentes y las preferencias del plenario. En particular, analizamos si las ventajas en el acceso a información y en la composición de las comisiones permanentes afectan la aprobación de legislación en el plenario.
Do the permanent committees have political jurisdictions that are respected by the Plenary of the House? Can these committees impose preferences that are different from those of the medium voters of their cameras? After two decades of democratic competition, the researchers interested in understanding the Latin American legislatures have available a large amount of quantitative and quality material that allows us to model the interactions between individual and collective members; and legislative institutions that regulate the treatment and sanctioning bills. In this article we focus on a problem that has received little attention in the Latin American legislation literature: the relationship between the preferences of members of the permanent committees and the preferences of the plenary. In particular, we analyze whether the advantages access to information and the composition of permanent committees affect the passing of legislation in the plenary.
Do the permanent committees have political jurisdictions that are respected by the Plenary of the House? Can these committees impose preferences that are different from those of the medium voters of their cameras? After two decades of democratic competition, the researchers interested in understanding the Latin American legislatures have available a large amount of quantitative and quality material that allows us to model the interactions between individual and collective members; and legislative institutions that regulate the treatment and sanctioning bills. In this article we focus on a problem that has received little attention in the Latin American legislation literature: the relationship between the preferences of members of the permanent committees and the preferences of the plenary. In particular, we analyze whether the advantages access to information and the composition of permanent committees affect the passing of legislation in the plenary.
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2011-01
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p. 25-48.
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Calvo, Ernesto y Iñaki Sagarzazu. 2011. El rol de las comisiones permanentes en las legislaturas de América Latina: un test del modelo informativo de éxito legislativo. Revista Latinoamericana de Política Comparada 04: 25-48.
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