Soluciones parlamentarias a las crisis presidenciales en Ecuador.
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Mejía Acosta, Andrés
Polga-Hecimovich, John
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Quito: CELAEP
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Este capítulo propone que las estrategias de coalición en regímenes presidenciales y parlamentarios convergen cuando los gobiernos minoritarios carecen del suficiente apoyo legislativo para aprobar su cartera de reformas. Un creciente volumen de trabajos ha mostrado cómo los presidentes minoritarios en América Latina utilizan una amplia gama de herramientas compuesta de incentivos para formar coaliciones con partidos de la oposición. Hay menor atención académica a la hora de explicarla otra cara de la misma moneda, esto es, cuando las coaliciones legislativas en proceso de erosión llevan la iniciativa política a punto muerto o bien producen inestabilidad en el régimen y cambio de gobierno como sucede en sistemas parlamentarios. Utilizando el caso de Ecuador, exploramos cuatro casos donde una oposición del Congreso articuló soluciones parlamentarias de facto a las crisis presidenciales. Nos centramos en dos dimensiones críticas de la supervivencia de la coalición: la naturaleza de la coalición y la duración del horizonte temporal de los políticos.
This chapter proposes that coalition strategies in presidential and parliamentary regimes converge when minority governments lack sufficient legislative support to pass its portfolio of reforms. A growing body of work has shown how minority presidents in Latin America use a wide range of tools made up of incentives to form coalitions with opposition parties. There is less academic attention in explaining the other side of the same coin, that is, when legislative coalitions in the process of erosion take the political initiative to deadlock or produce instability in the system and change of government as it happens in parliamentarian systems. Using the case of Ecuador, we investigated four cases where a congressional opposition articulated parliamentary solutions de facto to the presidential crisis. We focus on two critical dimensions of the survival of the coalition: the nature of the coalition, and the duration of the politicians.
This chapter proposes that coalition strategies in presidential and parliamentary regimes converge when minority governments lack sufficient legislative support to pass its portfolio of reforms. A growing body of work has shown how minority presidents in Latin America use a wide range of tools made up of incentives to form coalitions with opposition parties. There is less academic attention in explaining the other side of the same coin, that is, when legislative coalitions in the process of erosion take the political initiative to deadlock or produce instability in the system and change of government as it happens in parliamentarian systems. Using the case of Ecuador, we investigated four cases where a congressional opposition articulated parliamentary solutions de facto to the presidential crisis. We focus on two critical dimensions of the survival of the coalition: the nature of the coalition, and the duration of the politicians.
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p. 49-73.
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Mejía Acosta Andrés y John Polga-Hecimovich. 2011. Soluciones parlamentarias a las crisis presidenciales en Ecuador. Revista Latinoamericana de Política Comparada 04: 49-73.
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