Reconfiguraciones institucionales en organismos de fiscalización superior: análisis del proceso político de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República de Costa Rica
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Mora Brenes, Andrea
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México: FLACSO México
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El trabajo analiza cómo determinados contextos presentan condiciones favorables para el diseño o rediseño de organismos de control. El marco teórico en el que se inserta el estudio del proceso político responde al enfoque del neoinstitucionalismo de la elección racional, en el cual se asume que la creación y modificación de arreglos institucionales responde o es producto del acuerdo y negociación entre actores autointeresados. En este sentido las condiciones que determinan el diseño institucional se encuentran moldeadas en función del proceso político es decir; por el número y tipo de actores, por las reglas bajo la cuales éstos interactúan, sus posiciones, preferencias y capacidad de generación de acuerdos. A partir de estos elementos es que se pretende reconstruir el proceso político del diseño institucional de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República.
This thesis work has as principal aim to research how specific contexts present good conditions to the design or redesign of control´s organisms. The study doesn´t try to measure this redesign, in terms of if this is a good design or not, but it focuses in to analyze the characteristics of the politic process that leads that institutional redesign. The theoretical frame of the politic process study is the neoistitutionalism´s rational choice; witch assumes that the creation and modification of institutional arrangements is a product of an agreement or a trade off between the auto-interested actors. In this sense, the conditions that determine the institutional design are modelled as a function of the politic process; in other words, by the number and the kind of the actors, by the rules under witch they interact, their positions, preferences and capacity of generation of agreements. From these elements I try to rebuild the institutional design´s politic process of the Organic Law of the Republic´s General Contralory.
This thesis work has as principal aim to research how specific contexts present good conditions to the design or redesign of control´s organisms. The study doesn´t try to measure this redesign, in terms of if this is a good design or not, but it focuses in to analyze the characteristics of the politic process that leads that institutional redesign. The theoretical frame of the politic process study is the neoistitutionalism´s rational choice; witch assumes that the creation and modification of institutional arrangements is a product of an agreement or a trade off between the auto-interested actors. In this sense, the conditions that determine the institutional design are modelled as a function of the politic process; in other words, by the number and the kind of the actors, by the rules under witch they interact, their positions, preferences and capacity of generation of agreements. From these elements I try to rebuild the institutional design´s politic process of the Organic Law of the Republic´s General Contralory.
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Tesis de maestría
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138 páginas
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Mora Brenes, A. (2008). Reconfiguraciones institucionales en organismos de fiscalización superior: análisis del proceso político de la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República de Costa Rica. [Tesis de maestría, FLACSO México].
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